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PREFACE
This study was conducted under NASA Project
Nun_ur I0-2P_96 in the period May 1982 through
August 1982. The prln¢]pal investigator for
the contract was Aaron J. Gellman. The principal
authors of this study were Jerome T. Bentley,
Frank J. Berardino, and Frederick G. Tiffany.
The study was conducted for the Office of
Science and Technology Policy, Study Group on
AeYonautics Research and Technology Policy.
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The purpose of this study is to examine the appro-
priateness of government intervention in the civilian
market for aeronautics research and technology (R&T).
The study concentrates on examining the economic rationale
for government intervention; other public policy issues,
perhaps of equal importance, are not fully addressed.
The conclusion is that the institutional role played by
NASA in civilian aeronautics R&T markets is economically
justified. This conclusion is based upon five major
findings:
(I) Firms in the aeronautics industry do not have
sufficient incentives to conduct socially optimal levels
of R&T--that is, private firms will tend to underinvest
in these activities. Often it is the case that while in-
dustry returns (and consumer benefits) from particular pro-
jects may warrant investment from a social point of view, no
single firm can capture returns sufficient to induce it to
invest in one or more of these projects.
(2) Underinvestment by the private sector is most
likely to occur for projects leading to neutral technologies--
primarily discipline research, infratechnologies, and
certain types of applied research-- because these are the
farthest removed from commercial application, and because
returns to these projects are least likely to be appropriable
by a single firm.
(3) The government should intervene to ensure that
those R&T projects are conducted which lead to neutral
technologies that otherwise would not be developed because
of the problem of underinvestment.
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(4) It is particularly appropriate that the government
intervene in the aeronautics R&T market because aeronautics
output depends upon both high research intensity and a
wide technology base. Like other high technology industries,
aeronautics R&T represents a significant percentage of
the value of final output. What distinguishes aeronautics
is its dependence on inputs from so many other high technology
industries. The high wide technology base of the aeronautics
industry magnifies the possibility of underinvestment in
relevant R&T. As a result, government intervention should
include R&T efforts which cut across industry boundaries.
(5) In evaluating various policy options, the key
consideration is whether the problem of appropriabi!ity
in aeronautics R&T is addressed. Other factors for consideration
include: scale economies in conducting aeronautics R&T,
military spillovers, the structure of the aeronautics
industry, and the problems of risk and the payback period.
In addition to censidering NASA's current institutional
role, other policy options examined were: a free market,
approach, a subsidy/tax credit approach, user charges,
and a private R&T conglomerate. While each of these
options holds some promise, the current NASA institutional
role appears to be the best feasible solution.
The remainder of this report is organized into five
sections. In Section If, a general economic model which
demonstrates how firms tend to underinvest in R&T activities
is developed. It is shown that chis tendency toward
private underinvestment is due, in part, to the nature of
technology and how it is produced. In the third section,
the model is applied to the aeronautics industry. The
fourth section develops an analysis of the research intensity
and the width of the technology bases of high-technology
industries in the United States. Section V is a review of
the various policy options in light of the research findings.
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The final section of the report summarizes the findings
and also examines the issue of whether (and in what ways)
aeronautics, and appropriate public policies concerning
aeronautics, are unique.
Gellman Research Associates. Inc.
II. AN ECONOMIC MODEL OF THE MARKET FOR R&T
An economic model of the market for investments in
R&T is developed in this section. It focuses on the incentives
that private firms have to invest in R&T projects. The
primary purpose of the model is to provide a framework
within which imperfections in the R&T market can be detected
and assessed.
This model shows that imperfections generally exist
in R&T markets. As a result, individual private firms
lack economic incentives to invest in some R&T projects
that are in the best interests of society_ Because both
the model and the analysis are generally applicable, so is
the conclusion. The applicability of the model and the
analysis to the aeronautics industry in particular is
described in the next section of this report.
The section begins with a general discussion of the
nature of technology. This discussion provides a foundation
for the economic analysis that follows. Next, some key
technical concepts are described for the convenience of
the reader. Immediately following this discussion, the
formal economic model is developed.
market structure are then addressed.
are summarized.
Potential impacts of
Finally, the conclusions
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The Nature of Technology
Prior to a formal discussion of the nature of the
market for R&T in civil aeronautics, it is both convenient
and appropriate to discuss the nature of technology. While
several classifications of technology are possible, one
that will facilitate the analysis that follows is selected.
Specifically, the discussion focuses on differences in the
ability of firms to capture or "appropriate" returns to
investments in various types of R&T. The degree to which
_eturns on investments in R&T can be appropriated by individual
private firms is crucial to the economic analysis that
follows. If private firms are unable to capture all benefits
derived from R&T projects, the industry will, in general,
underinvest in technoiogy. 1
Neutral vs. Proprietary Technology
The most general distinction regarding an industry's
technology base is between "neutral" and "proprietary"
technology. Neutral technology represents those elements
of an industry_s technology base that are neutral with
respect to individual firms' proprietary interests. It is
difficult, and sometimes impossible, for individual firms
iFor a detailed discussion of classifications of
elements of industrial technology bases, see Gregory Tassey,
"Infratechnologies and the Role of Government," Forthcoming
in Technological Forecasting and Social Change. The discussion
that follows is partially, based on this work.
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to earn private rates of return on these types of R&T
activities sufficient to cover the opportunity cost of
their investment. This problem occurs either because
large investments in facilities are necessary to undertake
such R&T activities or because the benefits of R&T flow to
other concerns, either in the same industry or other
industries--i.e., neutral technology serves as a common
base for several different firms.
Elements of the technology base that may be considered
proprietary include those activities for which individual
firms are able to capture a return sufficient to justify
investing in an R&T project. Those activities that are
typically referred to as being developmental--e.g., the
development of a specific aircraft for commercial use--could
be regarded as proprietary in nature.
Even though this classification is convenient for
economic analysis, it should be stressed that virtually no
R&T (or R&D) activity can be classified as purely neutral
or purely proprietary. Even research conducted at the
most basic or generic level may hold the promise of some
commercial value to a single firm. However, it is likely
that the single innovating firm will capture only a fraction
of the total derived benefits from discipline or generic
research. On the other hand, some research activities
Gellman Research Associates. Inc.
directed toward the production of a specific commercial
product contain neutral elements to the extent that other
firms may capture some benefits through imitation. Nonetheless,
this distinction is a convenient framework within which
the economic anlaysis may be described.
A Further Classification of the Technology Base
The technology base of any industry is typically
composed of several elements. A convenient categorization
of these elements is as follows_
o Infratechnology
o Discipline research
o Applied research
o Development
Of these Four elements, infratechnology and discipline
research are the most neutral. Applied research may be
characterized as being partially neutral and partially
proprietary. Development is typically viewed as being
proprietary, although, as noted previously, it may be
partially neutral to the extent that it is borrowed by
other firms.
Infratechnology includes both methods and basic data
(e.g., test methods, computational procedures, and materials
characteristics) for conducting or using other types of
R&T. Perhaps the critical distinction between infratechnology
7
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and discipline research is that the former may have direct
applications to several industries. Thls type of technology
can serve as a common base for an entire industry (or
several industries) and, therefore, complete appropriation
by any single firm is difficult. 2
Discipline research is conducted at the most basic
or generic level of the discipline. Although this type
of research represents a base from which proprietary
applications are ultimately derived, it is not undertaken
with any specific application in mind. As such, it too
represents a common base for an entire industry and thus
is difficult to appropriate. The results of discipline
_esearch may also be u3ed by other industries, although
such use is usually indirect.
Unlike discipline research, applied research is
directed toward the solution of a specific problem (e.g.,
fuel efficiency). Nonetheless, applied research is not
undertaken with a specific commercial product in mind
(e.g., applied research may focus on fuel efficiency but
not on an engine designed for a specific aircraft). This
type of research may be partially appropriable in that it
may be adopted eventually in the design and development
2The term "infratechnology" should not be confused
with more restrictive meanings--i.e., basic and applied
knowledge for a specific industry. As used here, infratechnology
includes elements which may serve several industries.
See, Tassey, p. 5.
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of a specific product. However, to the extent that discoveries
in applied research may be learned by others or copied
when applied to a specific product, the full benefits may
not be capturable by the innovating firm.
Development represents the element of an industry's
technology base that is closest to commercial exploitation.
It is the activity of combining the component parts of a
product and requires the three afore_entioned elements of
the technology base as inputs. As such, it is typically
the most appropriable of the elements of the technology
base, but, as previously mentioned, it may not be
totally appropriable by any single firm.
Private Returns to R&T
Neutral technology provides a common base for all
firms in an industry. These elements of R&T were referred
to as neutral because it is difficult for private firms
to realize rates of return sufficient to justify initial
investment costs on an economic basis. There are several
reasons for this:
o Knowledge is expensive to produce, but cheap to
reproduce. A firm or institution that creates
knowledge must incur sometimes substantial
expenses, but others may reproduce, imitate, or
learn the knowledge at relatively low cost.
9
Oelmmn Research Amm4_w:lates,Inc.
!I
il
I
o
o
o
Use of the patent system to appropriate returns
to R&T is difficult and costly in the aeronautical
industry because technological advances often
depend upon knowledge of specific processes--e.g.,
supersonic flow in aeronautics--instead of some
mechanical or electronic device.
While knowledge that flows from R&T efforts is
a commodity in the sense that it embodies some
value, it is unique because it may be reused,
both by the innovating party and by those who
learn it, without diminishing its value in
production. This means that apart from the
relatively minor expense and low risk of learning
new knowledge, it is as valuable to the imitator
as to the innovator, at least in terms of its
value in production. 3
It is especially difficult for the firm conducting
R&T to capture returns on infratechnology since
it can be applied directly to other industries.
Even if the research firm were the only firm in
3Some R&T may lead to unique or highly desirable
innovations that give a firm a substantial headstart in a
new technology. In these cases, the demand for the firm's
products may be enhanced and its production costs lowered.
It should be stressed, however, that the headstart enables
the innovating firm to appropriate only part of the benefits
derived from its R&T efforts; once the knowledge is learned
and adopted by imitators, some benefits flow to other
firms.
I0
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Oits industry (a monopoly) some returns on the
investment would spill over into other industries
•nd may not be capturable, In deciding the
appropriate level of internally financed R&T, a
firm will consider only those returns that are
appropriable. In short, the private return on
investments in infratechnology generally will
br less than the total social returns, resulting
in an underinvestment in R&T, Of course, the
s_m,, ran be trur for both discipline and ap_,lied
r_,srarch, which can br borrowed indirectly by
oth,,r industries.4
Tht, existence of significant scale economies
nlny also make it difficult for individual firms
to realize sutlicient private return on neutral
R_'I'. It is oft,,n the cast, that R&T requires
l_r%le capital-intensive facilities--o.g., wind
tunnrls, foundrirs, or facilities for analyzing
n1_,tals and .,ntrrials. Thr rrturns that a single
pt'ivntr firm can ca|_t_l:'r art often not suff icirnt
to ]uat i{y ,,xt,,n,_iv,, investm,,nts in thrso capital-
intrnsivr f,1¢'ilit its.
4ConqIomrr,ltr,_ i';i11 somrtinlo.._ a|_|_lo|_riato mort o! th(,
b,,_¢'{ it:_ o! infr,_tr¢'i_r_olo,lirs th_n can firms involw,d in
a :_inql,, itldl|stry.
11
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With the exception of the last comment on scale
economies, each of the points listed above has a common
characteristic, They all describe the difficulties that
confront individual firms in appropriating the full benefits
derived from R&T efforts.
Priorities of Private Firms for Investments in Technoloqy
From the foregoing discussions, those types of research-
re.,at,,d a,'tivitios that a privat,, firm will tend to tlndcr-
take' ¢,an b_, listed in doscottdin_1 order of preference:
0
0
0
0
povolopmont.
Applied Research.
Piscipline Research.
Infratochnoloqy.
Devolol,m,,nt-rolat¢,d act ivit ie._ are those tor which the
private firm is mo_t likrIv to be able to capture the bulk
of the r,.sultin,! benefits, while discipline z'es_arch and
infralechnoloqy are least approprlable by private firms.
In other- words, dovelopmoTlt act iviti,,_ are devoted to the
pt-Odllction of propric, t,'Iry tochnoloqy; discipline reso,_rch and
in{ratochnoloqy fall at tho othor ond of tho approprlability
.q|_e_'tl'tln_ ill that they nl'O L'loI1_Ol_t._ of ,I ¢omm_ll tochnoloqy bilbo
for _,v_,r`11 llldtl.l| l'ti,.'_-- i .I'. , llt_It r`11 t o_'hl_oloqy.
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Key Economic Concepts
Several key economic concepts are important to the
analysis that follows. These concepts are:
o Market imperfections,
o Consequences of underinvestment,
o Externalities0
o Technolugy and the production function.
Each of these is discussed below.
Market Imperfections
In general, a market imperfection exists when a firm
fails to produce an extra unit of a good or service that
would leave at least one member of society better-off and
no member of society worse-off. This is best illustrated
by example.
Suppose that a firm in the aeronautics industry
identifies an R&T project that will produce consumer
benefits of $10 million. Suppose further that the cost of
the R&T effort is only $8 million. 5 If the market operates
properly, this R&T project will be undertaken and the firm
and consumers will split the $2 million net benefit. For
5The $i0 million consumer benefit is determined by
buyers' "willingness to pay" and, hence, reflects their
valuation of alternative goods and services that could be
purchased. Likewise, the $8 million cost reflects the
seller's "willingness to sell" in that it includes, as a
cost, a normal rate of return on resources employed--i.e.,
the cost includes the "opportunity cost" of not using
resources for the next-best alternative activity.
13
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example, if the firm is able to sell R&T results for
$9 million, it will realize "economic" profits 6 of
$i million. The consumers also will be better-off by
$i million (i.e., the benefits of the project summed
to $I0 million while the total price was only $9 million).
In this case, both the firm or, more properly, its
owners, and consumers are better-off, and no member of
society is worse-off.
If, however, a market imperfection exists, the R&T
project may not be undertaken and society (both the
producer and the consumers) would lose the $2 million
net benefit. In general, market failures exist when
sellers or firms are unable to capture a sufficient amount
of the benefits derived from production to cover their
costs. For example, if the firm in the example described
above were able to capture only $7 million of the $i0 million
in benefits by selling their R&T results, they would incur
a $i million loss. There are several reasons why a firm
may not be able to capture all (or enough) of the benefits
6That is, profits above the "normal" rate of
return on resources is employed.
14
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derived from R&T projects, but the following explanation
will suffice for present purposes.
Taking the example described above, suppose that the
R&T results must be embodied in a consumer product in
order to produce the $i0 million benefit. Suppose further
that the innovating firm produces the product but is able
to capture only $6 million of the $i0 million in benefits
because the innovation is copied by a rival (i.e., the
remaining $4 million in benefits go to the rival firm).
In this case, the innovating firm will suffer an economic
loss of $2 million ($6 million in captured benefits versus
the $8 million R&T cost).
Of course, if the innovating firm anticipates imitation
by its rival, the R&T project would never be undertaken
in the first place. In this event, a market imperfection
would occur; specifically, a project that would have
produced $2 million in net benefits would not be undertaken.
Consequences of Underinvestment
The term "underinvestment" will be used on several
occasions in the analysis that follows. If a firm (or
industry) invests less than the amount that would have
been invested in the absence of a market imperfection,
then underinvestment occurs. In other words, underinvestment
15
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in R&T occurs anytime a project that would have produced
total benefits greater than its cost is not undertaken. 7
The cost of underinvesument is a reduction in the
real value of goods and services produced with a given
level of scarce resources. Using the example developed
earlier, the failure of the firm (or industry; to undertake
the $8 inillion R&T project that would have produced $I0
million in benefits would result in a net economic loss
of $2 million.
Externalities
An "externality" exists whenever a benefit is produced
as a by-product of the consumption or production of a
good or service that is not capturable by either the
buyer or the seller. 8 Three general classes of externalities
can occur:
o Benefits that are not capturable by the producing
firm (e.g., the innovating firm) but are capturable
by rival firms in the same industry.
7More precisely, investment in R&T should be undertaken
up to the point at which marginal total benefits are
equal to the marginal opportunity costs of the project.
8Economists also recognize "negative" externalities.
A negative externality consists of a cost spillover from
the consumption or production of a good or service.
16
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o Benefits that spill over into other industries.
These spillovers are not capturable by firms
in the industry producing the initial innovation,
but may be captured by firms adapting the inno-
vation to serve a need in another industry.
o Benefits that are not capturable by buyers or
sellers in any industry.
An example of the first type of externality is the
case where a rival imitates the innovating firm and captures
some of the benefits of the R&T project. The automobile
industry has used methods from the aeronautics industry to
gather data on friction coefficlents to develop tires for
autos; this serves as an example of the second type of
externality (i.e., a spJllover to another industry).
Finally, suppose an innovation in the aeronautics industry
reduces the noise level of the aircraft. Residents living
near an airport, who are not airline customers, will
9
benefit. This is an example of the third type of externality.
9Externalities of this type can be "internalized"
by noise pollution standards. This illustration still
holds, however, if the innovation produces a noise level
lower than the standard. The same principle holds if
technology produces safety features that exceeo the
performance of safety regulations.
17
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The important point about externalities for the
present analysis is that external benefits are not appropriable
by the producing (or innovating) firm. Therefore, the
existence of externalities will tend to cause underinvestment
by individual private firms.
Technologv and the Production Function
The relationship between the quantities of various
resources used in making a product (inputs) and the quantity
of the product which those resources can produce (output)
is referred to as a "production function." The idea
behind this term is that for any combination of inputs,
the maximum quantity of output which that combination can
produce can be determined. A schedule relating combinations
of inputs to the maximum level of output which they can
produce is a production function.
It is important to stress that two or more different
combinations of the inputs may be able to produce the
same maximum output. For example, suppose that corn can
be grown using land, labor, and shovels (tools are usually
referred to as "capital"). It may be that ten bushels of
corn is the most that can be grown using one acre of
land, twenty man-hours of labcr, and two shovels, or by
using two acres of land, ten man-hours of labor, and one
shovel. In addition, twenty bushels of corn might be the
18
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maximum amount that two acres of land, twenty man-hours
of labor, and two shovels can produce. A schedule presenting
thls information for all possible combinations of land,
labor, and shovels would be a production function for
corn.
A standard simplification often made in economic
models is to assume that only exhaustible resources (e.g.,
labor, capital, and land) are factors of production, and
that these inputs can produce levels of output conditional
on some given state of technology. The analysis in this
paper, however, requires the direct inclusion of research
and technology as an input. This input can be thought of
as the quantity of resources devoted to improvirg the
method of production or the final product itself. For
example, if 5,000 man-hours ,-f research time and 5 laboratories
are combined with 30,000 man-hours of production labor
and 2 a_rframe assembly lines, the best possible result
may be the production of 50 aircraft, while if only 1,000
man-hours of research time are used, the techniques of
production which they develop using their 5 laboratories
may make it possible for 30,000 man-hours and 2 assembly
lines to produce 30 aircraft. With regard to product
quality, it may be that with only 1,000 man-hours of
research, the 30,000 man-hours and 2 assembly lines can
produce 50 aircraft, but that these aircraft are not as
fuel-efficient as those which were the result of more
research. 19
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An Economic Model of the Market for R&T
A detailed economic model of the market for investment
in R&T is described below. The model is developed in
several phases. The first two models describe rather
simple polar cases, distinguished, in each case, by the
ability of firms to capture returns to R&T. While these
models are somewhat unrealistic, they are easily understood
and provide benchmarks from which a more realistic model
may be developed. The third model is referred to as the
"partial appropriability model," in which the rather
stringent assumptions embedded in the first two models are
relaxed. In each of these three models, the focus is on the
varying ability of individual firms to appropriate benefits
derived from R&T activities. Also, considered are two
additional factors which further complicate the analysis:
risk, and the duration of the pay-back period.
The Polar Cases
The issue of the ap_ropriability of returns to R&T
investment can be considered in terms of two polar cases.
The analysis and the conclusions then follow in a relatively
straightforward manner. The two polar cases are:
o The "Common Technology Model"--none of the
returns to privately conducted R&T are appropriable
2O
Gellrnan Research ,_s_'tates. In,:.
(i.e., all privately induced R&T immediately
becomes part of the industry's common technology
base).
o The "Perfect Secrecy Model"--the benefits of
R&T efforts are completely appropriable; i.e.,
either perfect secrecy in the industry prevails
or a perfect and free patent system exists. I0
Conclusions derived from analysis of each polar case bear
striking differences, but both result in market imperfections
(underinvestment in R&T), even without considering the
classic sources of market imperfections such as externalities
and public goods.
In the case of the Common Technology Model--in which
none of the benefits of R&T are appropr_ab]_--assume
that the discoveries derived from R&T efforts are immediately
known to all other firms in the industry and are assimilated
or understood at zero cost. Under this scenario no single
firm will have any incentive to conduct R&T. The firm
that conducts the R&T and is responsible for the scientific
discovery will bear the full cost of the R&T effort.
However, given a competitive, or workably competitive,
market structure, all other firms will adopt the new
10By a "free" patent system, we mean that patents
are obtained instantaneously and at zero cost.
|
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technology if it produces results of commercial value.
By the theory of competitive markets, the price of a new
or improved product will be driven down to a level just
sufficient to cover opportunity costs in production but
insufficient to cover the initial costs of producing the
R&T. II Consequently, any firm that innovates will incur
investment costs in producing R&T but none of these costs
will be recouped. It is obvious, then, that no firm will
have an incentive to conduct R&T activities. 12
It is interesting to note that if only one firm
exists in the industry, a monopoly, underinvestment in
technology will not generally occur in the Common Technology
Model (at least in terms of the appropriability problem).
A monopolist enjoying substantial barriers to entry will
not have its technology borrowed or imitated by rivals
and thus, will be able to appropriate all capturable
benefits flowing to the industry. In this case, however,
the classic market imperfections generally attributable
to the monopolist will occur (i.e., excessive price,
restricted output and inefficiency in production).
llso long as the costs of adopting the R&T can be
recow, rod, all firms will adopt the new technology. The
price of the product embodying the technology will not be
sufficient to cover the cost of the R&T work because only
on_, firm has experienced those costs. The cost of the
init ia] R&T effort becomes a sunk cost which cannot be
retort, re,d, since competition will drive prices to a level
equal to the costs of tile imitating firms.
12This basic result has been derived for a more
general and detailed model. See L. E. Ruff, "Research
and Technological I'roqlcss in a Cournot Economy," Journal
of l.'conomic Theory, l, Deer,tuber 1969, pp. 397-415.
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In the second polar case--the Perfect Secrecy Model--it
is assumed that innovating firms will be able to appropriate
completely all of the benefits from their R&T efforts, by
use of either perfect secrecy or the perfect patent system
described above. Given the absence of traditional externalities,
(i.e., the absence of benefits not capturable by any firm
in the industry) standard economic theory does not justify
a subsidy under this scenario because private and social
returns to R&T will be equal. However, some waste or
inefficiency may still result.
The possible outcomes under this scenario are as
follows:
o A monopoly (i.e., a single firm in the industry).
o Inefficiencies associated with a heterogeneous
product market.
o Waste attributable to unwarranted duplication
of R&T activities.
Each of these outcomes is described below in more detail.
One possible outcome of the Perfect Secrecy Model is
that the industry will evolve to a monopoly market structure
(i.e., only one firm in the industry). This would occur
if a single firm produced an innovation so important that
competitors in the industry could not survive. The consequonces
23
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of such an outcome are predicted by economic theory.
Monopolies have incentives to charge higher prices and
produce lower outputs than those of competitive markets.
In short, if the monopolist behaves in its own best interest,
the classic market failures attributable to monopoly
power will occur; however, the impact of the monopoly
market structure on investment in R&T is less clear. 13
A second possible outcome of the Perfect Secrecy
scenario is a heterogeneous product market. Simply put,
several firms may produce desirable innovations that are
embodied in their products. Since, however, perfect
secrecy prevails, the several firms do not incorporate
rivals' innovations. The result is that each firm will
produce a mediocre product with one or a few particularly
desirable traits, but no firm will produce a superior
product that would incorporate all innovations in the
industry. Such an outcome would be particularly serious
in aeronautics, given the high and diverse technological
base of the industry. 14
13A considerable amount of empirical research has
been directed towards the question of innovation rates
for monopolies relative to more competitive market structures.
These are reviewed later in this section.
141t would be possible, of course, for firms to
cross-license innovations such that all firms would incorporate
features developed in the industry-wide R&T pool. As a
practical matter, however, this would violate the perfect
appropriability assumption in this model because of difficulties
in patenting disembodied inventions. This problem is
discussed later in this section.
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Finally, perfect secrecy is likely to lead to unwarranted
and wasteful duplication of research activities. 15 This
duplication would be a consequence of decentralized research
activities, coupled with the absence of the flow of data
within the industry caused by secrecy. Apart from the
expense of conducting experiments, the duplication of
large scale facilities would also be necessary.
The Partial Appropriability M_del
In this section, the assumptions _mbedded in the two polar
cases are relaxed and the more realistic situation is
examined in which R&T is partially appropriable--i.e.,
each firm benefits, to some extent, from the R&T activities
of other firms in the industry. It may also be assumed
that the productivity of the firm's own R&T efforts is
greater than the productivity of R&T borrowed from other
firms. Consider, for example, two of many possible firms
in an industry, firms A and B. Each one dollar of R&T
conducted by Firm A may yield I0 units of productivity to
Firm A but only 5 units to Firm B. The argument is symmetrical;
that is, Firm B realizes i0 units of productivity from
its own R&T projects (per dollar), while Firm A captures
5 units from B as a free rider.
15Not a|l duplication of research activities should
be considered wasteful. We have been told that one firm
in the aeronautics industry sometimes assigned two research
teams to study a common problem. The teams were given
instructions not to communicate for a given period of
tim_, in order to promote independent generation of ideas.
However, the two teams would eventually pool their resources
in _Jn effort to solve the common problem.
25
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There are two additional assumptions:
o Each firm behaves so as to maximize its own
profits.
o More than one firm exists in the market.
The conclusions that can be drawn from this more
complex and more realistic model are much less straightforward
than those derived from the polar models described above.
It can be shown, however, that the following will result: 16
o All firms in the industry will tend to underinvest
in R&T.
o Each of these firms will produce an output that
is less than optimum (i.e., less than what they
would produce, absent market imperfections) and
at costs that are higher than those consistent
with maximum efficiency.
Both of these conclusions warrant further discussion.
16The Partial Appropriability Model--and the consequent
results--a|_pears in the economic literature in various
forms. A detailed exposition can be found in Williams D.
Nordh:lu::,Invention t Growth L and Welfare: A Theoretical
Tr_eeatn!en__t of Technological Chanc_, the M.I.T. Press,
Cambridge,, MA, 1969, Chapter 3. See also, Karl Shell,
"Towards a Theory of Innovative Activity and Capital
Accumulation," The American Economic Review, 56, May
1966, pp. 62-68; L. E. Ruff, "Optimal Growth and Technological
Progrc,ss in a Cournot Economy," Technical Report No. II,
Institute for Mathematica| Studies in Social Sciences,
St_nford University, 1968; and Zvi Gri]iches "Issues in
Assessing the Contribution of Research and Development to
Productivity Growth, " The Bell JournaI of Economics, I0,
Spring lg7g, pp. g2-116.--
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Each firm, following the maximum profit motive,
invests in R&T only up to the point where its own profits
are maximized. However, the productivity, and hence
efficiency, of all other firms in the industry are influenced
by this R&T decision. Using our earlier illustration,
for example, each one dollar of R&T not undertaken by
Firm A reduces Firm B's productivity (as well as the
productivity of all other firms in the industry) by 5
units. Firm A, however, considers only its own return on
R&T, and not the returns of others in the industry, in
making R&T investment d :isions. In short, Firm A will
tend to underinvest in R&T because it cannot capture all
the benefits derived from its own R&T projects.
If each firm recognized spillover benefits to industry
rivals, and also had the altruistic motive of maximizing
total benefits flowing from R&T instead of just those
that are privately captured, all firms would increase the
level of R&T output and thereby increase the total amount
of benefits flowing from R&T efforts to the socially
optimal level. Since firms typically do not have such
altruistic motives, they are likely to underinvest in
R&T.
The second conclusion has a related explanation. To
the extent that firms underinvest in R&T, each firm's
27
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costs are higher than those that would be incurred under
the socially optimal R&T level. Consequently, total
industry costs are higher than those that would be realized
under maximum efficiency and, in addition, a larger number
of firms in the industry are required to produce a given
level of output.
Appropriating R&T through the Patent System
The preceeding analysis has focused on the problem
of the inappropriability of R&T as a cause of underinvestment.
It should be emphasized, however, that the inappropriability
of R&T investments is not inevitable. Specifically, the
U.S. patent system was designed to permit private firms
to capture the benefits of their inventions.
Despite the patent system, however, there is evidence
that private firms find it difficult to appropriate the
benefits of inventions, royalty payments notwithstanding.
One study, for example, estimates that the average value
of a patented invention is approximately thirty times the
average value of royalties received. 17
At least two explanations for the low royalties re-
lative to the economic value of patents have been offered.
The first suggests that development costs of the royalty-
paying firm are large and comparable to imitation costs so
17
Nordhaus, 0_. Cit., pp. 40-41.
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that there is little left over for the innovating firm to
18
capture.
The second explanation is possibly more persuasive
and directly relevant to the aeronautics industry. This
explanation is based on evidence that "disembodied" royalties
are small relative to their economic value while royalties
from inventions embodied in machinery are high. In short,
the innovator will find it difficult to appropriate the
benefits of an invention if it represents the discovery
of a process and is not embodied in a machine from which
royalties in the form of rentals can be received. 19
Moreover, if disclosure is required under a patent,
the unpatentable part of the invention will enter the
market free to imitators. Laws of nature are not patentable,
for example. Thus, the innovator often risks providing
knowledge free to competitors in patenting inventions. 20
The discussion above suggests that there exists a
bias against patenting disembodied technology. If a firm
believes that knowledge may be freely or cheaply transferred
to competitors, it may forego the patent system and operate
18Richard R. Nelson, ed., The Rate and Direction of
Inventive Activity, Princeton University Press, Princeton,
NJ, 1962, p. 354.
19Nordhaus, Op. Cit., p. 40.
20Ibid., 41.
29
Gellnum Ruemrch ,_llo_tes, Inc.
under secrecy. Secrecy, however, will very rarely be
complete since, once a product is offered on the market,
rivals can appropriate some of the benefits through imitation.
Nonetheless, the innovator can at least enjoy the advantages
of leadtime through secrecy. 21
Secrecy is not the only probable outcome resulting
from the difficulties associated with patenting disembodied
technology. The key issue here is appropriability. Even
if secrecy is maintained, some of the benefits derived
from the innovation will be captured by rival firms in
the industry. As a result, there will be a tendency to
underinvest in disembodied technology. This type of
technology is most likely to result from discipline and
applied research since, by definition, thesetypes of
research are not directed toward a specific commercial
product. Underinvestment in infratechnology is likely to
occur for the same reason. In short, the inability of
the patent system to permit single firms to appropriate
the full benefits of disembodied technology causes a bias
against the private development of this type of technology.
21This discussion provides some insight as to why a
patent-sharing agreement exists in the civil aeronautics
industry. This is discussed In the next section of this
report.
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Externalities
The existence of externalities is central to the under-
investment problem. The three classes of externalities
described previously are: benefits not capturable by the
innovating firm, but appropriable by rivals within the in-
dustry; benefits capturable only by firms in other industries;
and, benefits not capturable by any firms. The conclusions
described above hold, even if only the first type of ex-
ternalities are present. The level of underinvestment in
R&T will be even more pronounced if the other two types of
exter_alities are also present. This follows since the
relative _,roportion of total benefits that are capturable by
the si_,11e innovating firm will be even smaller.
Risk and the Pay-Back Period
Two other factors, risk and the payback period,
should be considered in evaluating the tendency of private
firms to invest in R&T projects even though neither can
be considered a classic market imperfection. These two
factors are especially significant with respect to R&T
pro3ects b_,cause such activities typically exhibit greater
risk and longer payback periods than other types of investments.
Risk occurs when the outcome of a project or activity
is uncertain, but the uncertainty is sufficiently mild so
that the firm can estimate the likelihood of several
_ossible outcomes. Given that the probability of each
_,_it_'_m_' c_n be esti,nated with some de_ree of confidence,
_lln_n Reswrch _ Ira:.
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firms can use standard (or subjective) decision techniques
to determine an appropriate course of action (i.e., whether
or not they should undertake an R&T project).
It should be noted that the risk problem is separate
from the appropriability problem. That is, even if the
expected pay-off of a particular R&T project is sufficient
to cover the expected costs of the project, the firm may
still decide to forego the project if the firm is averse
to risk. The following example serves to illustrate this
point.
Suppose that a firm is considering a potential R&T
project and the cost of the project is known with certainty
to be $8 million. For the sake of simplicity, further
assume that only two outcomes are possible: I) the R&T
project will yield zero benefits, or 2) the R&T project
will yield total benefits of $20 million. If the two
outcomes are equally probable--i.e., they both will occur
with a probability of one-half--then the expected pay-off
from the R&T project will be $i0 million. This expected
pay-off is sufficiently large to cover the certain costs
of the R&T project, and will produce an expected net
benefit of $2 million. Nonetheless, the consequences of
failure may be so disastrous that the firm will decide
not to undertake the R&T project.
32
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Standard portfolio-selection theory provides some
useful insights into the types of incentives firms have
to conduct risky R&T projects. If the probability distribution
characterizing the range of possible outcomes flowing
from an R&T project is "well-behaved," then firms can
reduce risk by diversifying into a large number of relatively
small projects. If, however, the nature of the industry
is such that diversification into a large number of small
projects is not feasible, then risk reduction through
diversification will not be feasible. Consider, for the
sake of illustration, two firms, A and B, each having a
net worth of $i0 million. Suppose further that firm A,
because of the nature of the market within which it operates,
can conduct I0 separate R&T projects, each costing $I
million. Firm B, on the other hand, has only one R&T
option, a $I0 million project. Even if the expected pay-
off from the R&T activities of each firm is the same,
firm A, by diversifying into several smaller projects,
will face considerably less risk than firm B. Thus, the
scale at which an R&T project must be conducted affects a
firm's willingness to undertake it.
In addition to the scale of R&T projects, the structure
of the industry also plays a role in determining the
willingness of firms to conduct R&T projects. Some industry
33
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structures (monopoly and oligopoly) are characterized by
a few large firms, while others have many small firms.
Large firms, with large research divisions engaged in
several projects, face considerably less risk than small
firms which are able to conduct_only a few projects. As
a final note, it should be apparent that if several small
firms can pool their R&T projects at a centralized institution,
the total amount of risk facing the group will be considerably
less than that of each firm individually. 22
The payback period can be defined as the interval
between the time at which expenses in a particular project
are first incurred and the time at which sufficient revenues
are obtained to achieve a break-even point. From the
perspective of the owners or stockholders in a particular
firm, the payback period, in isolation, should not influence
a firm's incentive to undertake investment projects.
Standard economic theory states that, regardless of the
timing of returns on a project, it should be undertaken
so long as it increases the net present value of the
firm. Moreover, should they require cash, the owners of
a firm theoretically can sell their assets at any time
for a market price which reflects the assets' discounted
22This, of course, is nothing more than an insurance
principle; i.e., the industry "insures" individual members
against risky R&T projects through the centralized R&T
pool.
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value. There are, however, two factors which complicate
the payback-period issue. These are: management incentives
to undertake projects with relatively short payback periods,
and the relationship between the payback period and risk.
A significant amount of recent literature has presented
arguments that the relationship between management incentive
and the payback period is the cause of diminished R&T
activities within the U.S. economy. The problem is that
R&T projects typically have rather lengthy payback p_riods,
while management has incentives to undertake projects
with relatively short payback periods. At almost any
level in the management hierarchy of a given firm, promotion
opportunities for individuals depend on their short-term
performance. That is to say, the profitability of recent
projects determines, to a large extent, the rate at which
project managers will be promoted. In addition, the
management bonus structure is tied to short-term profit
performance, usually the preceding year. The combined
effect of these two factors provides strong incentives
for management to undertake projects with relatively
short payback periods.
The payback period also affects the type of R&T that
firms choose to undertake, as well as the level of these
activities. An overview of the typical product life
35
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cyclt' ,;erw, s to verify this point. The cycle starts with
discil_line (o_ b,a.,_ic) research, which provides the scientific
di._;_.overy of a new concept. Laboratory verification of
tl_, di.,_cow, ry is provided through applied research. Finally,
dt,mon,;tIat ion of the application and the feasibility of
ploduct en_lineerin_j are achieved through development
act ivitit,:;. 'l'hi._ means that discipline research, which
i._ the, t,ltth_,:_t rt,moved from comm_,rcial exploitation, is ,
the' l_',l:;t l ikt'ly t_ bt, tlndt, rtakcn, given tht TM managoment
inc,'nt l:,':; whi_'h I',aw' b,,en described ,.bovt,.
Exhibit I1-1 providt,s a list of several in_portant
intlt_v,lt it)ll:; dntl tilt, cOl'lespondillg length of time from tile
d,lt_' t}! initi,tl conc,.,|_tion to tilt" date o! commercial
i tit l odtlt't it_n. Tilt" dvor,lgt" duz'ation for ,al ! innovations
li:;tt,d i.'; lg.. _. g_,ars, and tht, longest duration, that: of
tht, I_,lc,'m,lkt'l, is 42 yeal's. It should be noted that tilt,
fiqul',"_ I'l't_t_l'tt':i in l.:xhibit II-i und_,t'state tho true
t_,lyl_,tck |_,liott in that they only reflect tho commet'cial
il_t lt_tlut't it_it tt,_t o. III sonlt" c,ast,:_, seVt,l,tl addit ion,tl
y_',tl','; Wt'lt' IIl't't':l,'_al_ to ,|chit,vt" tilt" bl't,,tk-evt,n l_oillt.
It Ii,t:; ,ll:;t} bt,,'n nott,d that the, l_,lyb,_t'k [)t,l'iott all(|
l'i:;k ,|1,' l,'l,lt,'tt; tit,It i;_, th," l¢_ntl_'l" tilt' |_,lyb,lck t-'lit_d
Grllm_n Re._earch A_oclate._, Inc.
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Exhibit II-i
DURATION BETWEEN CONCEPTION AND COMMERCIAL
INTRODUCTION FOR SELECTED INNOVATIONS
Year of Year of
First First
Conception Realization
Duration
Time
Heart Pacemaker
Hybrid Corn
Hybrid Small Grains
Green Revolution
Wheat
Electrophotography
Input-Output
Economic Analysis
Organophosophorus
Insecticides
Oral Contraceptive
Magnetic Ferrites
Video Tape Recorder
Average Duration
1928 1960 32
1908 1933 25
1937 1955 19
1950 1966 16
1937 1959 22
1936 1964 28
1934 1947 13
1951 1960 9
1933 1955 22
1950 1956 6
19.2
Source: Robert C. Dean, Jr., "The Temporal Mismatch - Innovation's
Pace vs. Management's Time Horizon", Research Management, May, 1974,
p. 4 (from Battelle Memorial Institute Study, 1973).
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that it is known that a particular project will have a
payback period of 20 years. Even if the firm is certain
that this R&T project will yield significant benefits in
terms of today's markets, it will face considerable
uncertainty regarding the value of those benefits twenty
years hence. Uncertainty regarding both market demand
for the product, as well as market conditions for necessary
productive inputs, may cause the firm to forego the
investment opportunity.
The Impact of Market Structure on R&T Activities
Although the appropriability of benefits derived
from R&T efforts should be regarded as the single most
important factor affecting individual private firms'
decisions to invest in R&T, market structure may also
play a role. 23 The purpose of the general review presented
immediately below is to investigate the possible mitigating
23Market structure describes the organization of
both buyers and sellers in an industry. On the sellers'
side, the market structure is characterized by the number
and the distribution of firms by size, as well as the degree
to which various stages of production are integrated into
one or several producers. The number of buyers and the
distribution of buyers by size characterize the market
structure on the buyers' side.
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effects of market structure on the propensity for private
firms to conduct R&T projects.
Several specific facets of market structure (or
market conduct) that may affect private firms' R&T
decisions have been identified in the literature. A list
of those relevant to the issues at hand is as follows:
o firm size and seller concentration,
o product diversity,
o R&T rivalry.
Each of these is discussed below in turn.
Firm Size and Seller Concentration
Conventional economic thinking suggests that large
firms may have certain advantages over smaller firms in
terms of their willingness to conduct R&T projects. It
should be stressed, however, that in the present context,
firm size is distinctly different from seller concentration.
For example, a relatively large firm may be a member of
an industry in which several or a rather large number of
firms exist. On the other hand, it is possible that a
smaller firm may be a member of a market in which only a
few, or sometimes a single firm participates.
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Several characteristics of large firms have been
suggested as providing advantages in conducting R&T.
These include:
o The ability of large firms to secure financial
resources necessary to conduct large-scale R&T
projects.
o The fact that size, by itself, may enable relatively
large firms to accept the risk inherent in
research.
o The ability of large firms to take advantage of
scale economies that may exi-t in research
activities.
o The ability of large firms to spread the benefits
derived from R&T activities over several products
(this advantage applies mainly to large firms
producing multiple products).
It should be recognized, however, that some take issue
with at least some of these alleged advantages of large
firms. It has been argued, for example, that a number of
individual managers within a large firms must accept the risk
of conducting R&T projects. 24 In large organizations,
the decision to accept or reject a specific project often
24F. M. Scherer, Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1980, p.
414.
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must pass through a large portion of management hierarchy.
This means that several individuals must simultaneously
accept the risk inherent in research projects. A smaller
firm, on the other hand, often has only one or a few
individuals responsible for this type of decision. As a
result, it may be that smaller firms are more likely to
accept this type of risk, other things being the same,
since it is more likely that a few rather than a large
number of individuals are willing to accept risks.
The evidence in the economics literature regarding
the effects of firm size on propensity to undertake
research efforts is less than unambiguous. The strongest,
or best, evidence suggests that the willingness to under-
take research increases as firm size increases up to some
threshold point, and then declines as firms grow still
larger. The weakest evidence suggests that firm size has
25
no impact on research efforts.
There is little doubt that large firms do conduct a
disproportionately large share of total R&D. For example,
data from the National Science Foundation indicate that
only about 10,000 of 263,000 U.S. manufacturing firms
employing fewer than 1,000 workers maintained formal R&D
25Unfortunately , all the empirical work reviewed below
focuses on R&D rather than on R&T. To the extent that these
two activities are correlated, these studies are, none-
theless, relevant.
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programs in 1972. However, 481 of 540 firms with 5,000
26
or more employees maintained formal R&D programs.
Aggregate comparisons of this type, however, tend to
mask the effects that other characteristics of the firm
have on R&D efforts, including wide variations across
industries.
While there have been numerous studies on the relation-
27
ships between firm size and R&D, one conducted by Scherer
in 1965 significantly improved on the research designs of
the preceding studies. It was found that R&D efforts did
increase as firm size increased but only up to some
threshold point. Once firm size exceeded that threshold
point, further growth in firm size indicated a leveling
28
off or even diminished level of R&D effort. These
results were confirmed in a later study by R. E. Schrieves.
29
26Scherer, Op. Cit., p. 419.
27See I. Horowitz, "Firm Size and Research Activity,"
Southern Economic Journal, 28, January 1962, pp. 298-301;
and J. S. Worley, "Industrial Research and the New Competition,"
Journal of Political Economy, 69, April 1961, pp. 183-186.
28F. M. Scherer, "Size of Firm, Oligopoly, and Research:
A Comment," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political
Science, 31, May f965, pp. 356-366.
29R. E. Schrieves, "Firm Size and Innovation: Further
Evidence," Industrial Organization Review, 4, No. I.
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Similar results were obtained in a separate study of the
3O
drug industry.
Nonetheless, this basic relationship between firm
size and R&D effort is less than fully robust. Several
_
I
i
?
I
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other studies found no significant relationship between
firm size and R&D expenditures. 31 Most likely, several
factors influence the level of a firm, s R&D effort, and
it is difficult to separate the impact of firm size from
them.
In summary then, the best or strongest evidence
suggests that moderately sized firms are most likely to
engage in R&T activities. Smaller firms appear less
likely to engage in R&T efforts, and very large firms are
likely to conduct R&T at levels proportionately below, or
at least not greater, than the medium or moderately sized
32
firms. . The discussion provided thus far in the economic
30H. G. Grabowski, "The Determinants of Industrial
Research and Development: A Study of the Drug, Chemical,
and Petroleum Industries," Journal of Political Economy,
16, March-April 1968, pp. 292-306.
31See for example, E. Mansfield, Industrial Research
and Technolo@ical Innovation--An Econometric Analysis,
Norton for the Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics
at Yale University, New York, 1968; D.C. Mueller, "The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 81, February 1967, pp. 58-
87; and T. M. Kelly, The Influences of Firm Size and
Market Structure on the Research Efforts of Large Multiple-
Product Firms, Ph.D. Dissertation, Oklahoma State University,
1970.
32Scherer places the moderately sized firm at sales
ranging between $240-400 million at 1978 price levels.
See Schcrer, Op. Cit.
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literature has not totally resolved the issues regarding
the relationship between firm size and R&T.
Earlier, it was suggested that another advantage that
large firms may have over smaller firms is the ability to
spread out the benefits of R&T activities over several
products. This particular advantage, of course, would
only apply to those firms producing several different
33
products. A second and somewhat related advantage here
is the ability of multi-product firms to conduct several
related projects and thus, through diversification,
spread the inherent risk in R&T over several projects.
Evidence that this type of an advantage may exist is
supported by several studies. 34 It is particularly in-
teresting to note that one study discovered that the most
pronounced effects of diversification appeared for firms
whose multiple products were closely related--i.e., the
products were sold in related markets. Firms producing
multiple products in disparate or unrelated markets would
appear to have a lesser advantage. 35 In brief, it seems
that the ability of a firm to diversify through multiple
33See Richard R. Nelson, "The Simple Economics of
Basic Scientific Research," Journal of Political Economy,
67, June 1959, pp. 297-306.
343ee, for example, Arabowski, Op. Cit.; and F.M.
Scherer, "Firm Size, Market Structure, Opportunity, and
the Outp,*t of Patented Inventions," American Economic
Review, 55, December 1965, pp. 1097-1125.
35Ke11y, Op. Cit. (]970)44
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products has a substantial impact on the likelihood or
level of R&D effort, if the benefits of research can be
spread over several somewhat related products.
Several studies have also focused on the pote, tial
impact that seller concentration has on R&D efforts.
Seller concentration measures the extent to which the
largest firms dominate sales in a market; it is often
measured (at least in the studies reviewed below) as the
market share held by the four largest firms in the industry.
The evidence suggests a weak but positive relationship
between seller concentration and R&D effort, at least _or
U.S. industries. As was the case with firm size, it
appears that this relationship disappears when the concentration
level exceeds a threshold point.
Early studies found a weak positive relationship
between seller concentration and R&D effort. 36 In a
later study, Scherer found seller concentration to significantly
affect R&T effort, but noted that the explanatory power of
concentrat!on fell when qualitative variables reflecting
36SL, e Horowitz, O_. Cit.; and D. Hamberg, R&D; Essays
on the Economies of Research and Development, Random House,
New York.
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i "opportunity class" (i.e., producer, consumer, durable or37
non-durable goods) were included in the model. He also
discovered that maximum predicted R&D effort (measured by
technical employment) was predicted at concentration
levels between 50 and 55 percent (i.e., percent of sales
captured by the four largest firms in the industry).
Both of these results were confirmed in a later study by
38
Kelly.
It has also been suggested that a second factor,
somewhat related to seller concentration, may affect the
tendency of private firms to conduct R&D. Specifically,
it has been argued that the profitability or liquidity
(i.e., cash flow) of a firm may enhance the ability of
firms to finance internally risky R&D projects for which
financing may be difficult to obtain. The evidence,
however, does not stroncly support this hypothesis. 39
R&T Rivalry
Another issue regarding market structure is the
potential impact of technological rivals on the level and
37
F. M. Scherer, "Market Structure and the Employment
of Scientists and Engineers," American Economic Review,
57, pp. 524-531.
38
Kelly, Op. Cit., (1970).
39For a survey of these studies, see Mortin I. Kamien
and Nancy L. Schwartz, "Market Structure and Innovation:
A .qurvev," Journal of Economic Literature, 13 March 1975,
p_>. I- 37.
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timing of R&T efforts in an industry. The important
question here is: Does the existence of rivalry produce
an environment that promotes or reduces the level of R&T
effort, and does it affect the speed of development? The
answer to this question ultimately depends upon the firms'
perceptions of the relative benefits and costs of innovation
versus imitation as well as the firm's expectations regarding
rival behavior.
In a setting where rivalry exists, the chief advantage
of innovation is the benefit of a large temporary market
share that is enjoyed by the leading innovator. The
major disadvantage, of course, is that sometimes substantial
cost_ are incurred through research, and then development,
activities. Although the imitator may temporarily lose a
favorable market position, it does usually incur a lower
level of costs relative to the innovator.
Much of the work that has been done on the problem
of technological rivalry has been of a theoretical nature
that has not yet been empirically tested. Nonetheless,
some conclusions can be offered. These include:
o Imitation is more desirable if it is quick and
the expected market share through imitation is
relatively large. 40
40F. M. Scherer, "Research and Development Resource
Allocation under Rivalry," Quarterly Journal of Economics,
81, August 1967, pp. 359-394.
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Firms that expect to be a permanent leader in
the industry (in terms of market share) will
accelerate the pace of innovation if rivals do.
Imitators, on the other hand, will reduce the
pace when rivals accelerate technological development.41
An intermediate degree of rivalry is likely to
lead to the most rapid development rate; i.e.,
some structure between competition and monopoly
is most conducive to promoting R&T.42
Uncertainty regarding the introduction of an
innovation by a rival will tend to slow the
pace of R&D in early phases of a project, and
increase it during later phases.43
If innovational rivals exist, cash flow or
liquidity problems will prolong the development
period and reduce the acceptability of some
projects. 44
41W. L. Baldwin and G. L. Childs, "The Fast Second
and Rivalry in Research and Development," Southern Economic
Journal, 36, July 1969, pp. 18-24.
42M. I. Kamien and N. L. Schwartz, "On the Degree of
Rivalry for Maximum Innovative Activity," Discussion
Paper No. 64, Center for Mathematical Studies in Economics
and Management Sciences, February, 1974.
43M. I. Kamien and N. L. schwartz, "Risky R&D with
Rivalry," Annals of Economic and Social Measuro, 3 January
1974, pp. 267-277.
44M I Kamien and N. L. Schwartz, Self-Financing• • ,,
of an R&D Project," The American Economic Review, 68,
June 1978, pp. 252-261.
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As this l_st of conclusions suggests, the impact of
rivalry on the level and pace of research activities
depends upon perceptions and reactions of rivals. The
implications for the civil aeronautics industry are best
described within a historical context of the behavior of
firms participating in this market. This analysis is
provided in the next section of this report.
Summary
Briefly summarizing the results of the analysis in
this section:
o If the technology base of a particular industry
is purely common--i.e., firms are unable to
appropriate any of the benefits derived from
R&T activities--then no firm in the industry
will have any incentive to invest in R&T. This,
of course, represents the most extreme case of
underinvestment in R&T.
o If firms are able to appropriate all the benefits
derived from R&T efforts, strong incentives for
investment will exist and market imperfections
attributable to the nature of knowledge will
not be present. However, several other
imperfections may still exist. These are
the problems associated with a monopoly
49
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market structure, inefficiencies due
to a heterogeneous product market_ and
unnecessary duplication of research efforts.
Even if benefits are only partially appropriable,
a market imperfection will exist to the extent
that firms underinvest in R&T projects. That is,
the level of investment will be less than the amount
that would occur if all R&T benefits were appro-
priable by single innovating firms. Production
costs for these firms would also be higher than
those that would be incurred under maximum
efficiency.
Firms may also be discouraged from undertaking
investment in R&T because of risk. The ability
to diversify into several small R&T projects may
mitigate the level of risk facing a single firm.
llowever, if the nature of the industry is such
that small R&T projects are infeasible, then
risk becomes a more serious issue.
Because of manaclement incentives, as well as
the relatiot_shil_ to risk, the lengthy payback
period associat_.d with R&F proiects may even
further discouraqe firms from such investments.
5 0
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This is particularly true for discipline or
basic research; in other words, the payback
period promotes preference for investment in
development activities.
o Roqardin.j market structure, both firm size and
sol|co concentration may affect the propensity
for private firms to conduct R&T projects.
Evidence suqqests that R&T intensity is weakly
but positively related to both; however, these
ett-t'c'ts diminish ,it :_omc thie::l,:,ld l,oint. In
addition, tlm ability ot firms to dix'c,r,,_ify in
pi'oduct markets and technoloqical rivalry may
in,'it',l::_, I_,_'I' inten::ity.
Some t in,il collullents on the, isstle el appropriability
and the, n,lture ot knowl¢,dq_, ,ilt, worthwhile. The t-act
that knowledqe can be l¢,arnod r¢,lat iw, Iy cheaply and may
bt, i_,u:;ed without diminishinq its value makt,s it p,lrticul,lrly
ditt icult for any -;inqle tirm to appropriate bermfits.
It i:; :;om,'wh,lt p,li,Idoxical th,it ul,llk,,t impt, itect ions du_'
to th¢' iil,il_l,lopi'i,IL_ility ¢_t kmlwl¢,dq,, di';,Ipp,',li', or ,it
l¢',l:;t ,Ir,, dilninit;h,,d it ,i :;inql_, firm pro,vail,,; i;I tim
lU,lrk,,t . A m,_n,_t,,,I i:;t _,l 1 I I,_' ,ll, l_' t_ ,11,1,1_t,ii,lt,, ,11 I
I_,'tl,'! It:: _ l,,wlll,l ll,,lu R,_T wttlllu th,, itl,lll:;t t\'. Ih,wl'v,,l',
th,,::,' lll,ll!,,'t IlU[','l t',','l I,ul:; tll,|t ,11_' I'l'_'*,[l,'tt',,I l'v t't'_,_ll_,,I',ll,"
',l
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theory as being attributable to a monopoly market
structure will then be present.
Even apart from the monopoly problem, a paradox
remains. If the benefits derived from R&T activities are
not .ippropz-iable, other firms in the industry serve as
imitators and promote the rapid diffusion of new technology.
The problem is that the rate of diffusion and incentives
for individual firms to conduct R&T are inversely related;
that is, the more rapid the diffusion process among firms
in an indu.,_try, the less the incentive for any single
firm to cox_duct R&T. On the other hand, if benefits
derived l_om R_T are appropriable by individual firms
within an industry, the rate of diffusion will slow down
and tht. problem ot a heterogeneous product market arises.
This di._cussion suggests that the very nature of technological
knowl,,dqe, by itself, creates market imperfections.
%6-
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III. AN APPLICATION OF THE ECONOMIC MODEL TO THE
CIVIL AERONAUTICS R&T .MARKET
The economic model developed and described in the
previous section is applied below to the civil aeronautics
R&T market. The discussion begins with a description of
the sources of R&T in the market. Next, the applicability
of the Partial Appropriability Model to the civil aero-
nautics R&T market is assessed, with the conclusion that
it is an apDT-priate characterization of the aeronautics
R&T market. Extensions to the basic economic model are
then offered; these describe the nature of technological
rivalry, buyer concentration, and the role of the military
in the industry. Following this, an analysis of risk faced
by firms in the industry is provided.
The key findings of this section are:
o Aeronautics firms in general have a
tendency to underinvest in R&T because
of the difficulty they have in capturing
a sufficient portion of the benefits from
these activities.
o The effects of large risks encountered in
developing new aircraft are parallel to
and reinforce those due to the appropriability
problem: firm resources are most likely to
be devoted to those activities closest
to commercialization.
53
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o History suggests that dominant firms in the
airframe industry will be reluctant to make
technological leaps forward because they do
not wish to compete with their existing and
successful product lines and their incentives
to undertake the considerable risks involved
are less than those of companies with less
of a stake in the existing market for aircraft.
Elements of the Civil Aeronautics Industry Technology Base:
An Example
Recall that the four basic elements of an industry's
technology base are: infratechnology, discipline research,
applied research, and development. These four elements
may play a role in the development of a specific aircraft
as follows:
o Discipline Research--a study of laminar flow
provides information regarding the properties
of the flow of particles about a foil (laminar
flow deals with the nonturbulent flow of fluid
in layers near a boundry).
o Infratechnology--sophisticated computational or
numerical methods are necessary to conduct the
laminar flow study.
54
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o Applied Research--the results of the above-
described discipline research are used to study
desirable properties of aircraft-wing shapes.
This research is applied because it is not yet
concerned with developing a wing for a specific
aircraft (note also that infratechnology still
plays a role here since sophisticated computa-
tional methods facilitate the analysis of wing
design).
o Development--the results of the applied research
are used to develop or design a wing for a
specific aircraft.
Based on the previous discussion, the examples of infratechnology
and discipline research represent basically neutral elements
of the industry's technology base. The applied research
on wing design may be partially neutral and partially
proprietary. Finally, the development phase is largely
proprietary (although benefits may not be totally appropriable
by the innovating firm.)
To facilitate the discussion which follows, it is
appropriate to cross-classify the description of the
basic elements of the aeronautics industry technology
base with the program titles utilized by NASA and DOD.
Such a classiEication scheme is shown in Exhibit III-l.
Whi|e the fit especially between the NASA and DOD categories
is not exact, this presentation is meant only as a guide
to th., readpr.
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Sources and Types of R&T in the Aeronautics Industry
The discussion in Section II of the incentives to
produce R&T can be brought more clearly into focus by
considering the sources of R&T in the aeronautics industry
and the types of technology which each can provide. With
this foundation, the issue of appropriability can be discussed
specifically in terms of the aeronautics industry.
There are four sources from which the aeronautics
industry draws its R&T:
o Military Research--the military is a significant
source of aeronautical R&T, which it provides
to the industry in a number of ways. A major
portion of this R&T is performed directly by
firms within the industry under specific military
contracts, including contracts in which two or
more firms are funded to develop competitive
prototypes (e.g., the C-5A transport and F-16
fighter). In addition, the military authorizes
IR&D at major military contractors and makes
available (for a fee) military facilities for
experiments and occasionally for production.
Many civilian applications can be drawn from
the knowledge acquired through these activities,
some examples of which will be given below.
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NASA/NACA--NASA, and its predecessor, the NACA,
has served as a conduit for government-sponsored
R&T to the aeronautics industry. It conducts
its own aeronautical research, the results of
which are publicly available unless given a
security classification because of military
relevance. NASA also funds R&T performed by
individual firms and universities. Finally,
the agency maintains advanced research facilities
which are available not only for NASA-sponsored
projects, but for research activities initiated
and funded entirely by the private sector.
Through the above activities, NASA provides
discipline research, applied research, and
infratechnology.
The Academic Community--a major contribution of
the nation's universities is to train the scientists
and engineers who perform the R&T described
above. Universities also perform some R&T in
the areas of infratechnology and discipline
research although they are restricted by a lack
of the expensive, large scale, advanced facilities
such as those operated by NASA and the military.
58
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NASA/NACA--NASA, and its predecessor, the NACA,
has served as a conduit for government-sponsored
R&T to the aeronautics industry. It conducts
its own aeronautical research, the results of
which are publicly available unless given a
security classification because of military
relevance. NASA also funds R&T performed by
individual firms and universities. Finally,
the agency maintains advanced research facilities
which are available not only for NASA-sponsored
projects, but for research activities initiated
and funded entirely by the private sector.
Through the above activities, NASA provides
discipline research, applied research, and
infratechnology.
The Academic Community--a major contribution of
the nation's universities is to train the scientists
and engineers who perform the R&T described
_bove. Universities also perform some R&T in
the areas of infratechnology and discipline
research although they are restricted by a lack
of the expensive, large scale, advanced facilities
such as those operated by NASA and the military.
58
GeHman Research _sodate.s, Inc
LI
i
J
o Privately Initiated R&T--in addition to military
and NASA-sponsored projects, firms in the aeronautics
industry also perform their own R&T. Such
privately financed projects typically involve
development or applied research.
Appropriability of R&T Sources
With an understanding of which organizations provide
which types of R&T, the question of appropriation by firms
engaged in development of commercial aircraft can be addressed.
R&T derived from military sources is often appropriable
by a private firm in the sense that technologies are "copied"
for civilian aircraft (some examples are provided in
1
Exhibit III-2). It should be stressed, however, that the
total spillover benefits from military R&T to civilian air-
craft are not generally appropriable by a single private
firm. The B-707, for example, was developed contemporaneously
with the KC-135. The wina placement was then copied two years
later by Douglas and Convair. (See Exhibit III-3).
R&T provided by NASA, or the academic community, is
clearly neutral. The results of these R&T are disseminated
publicly, thus, they are equally accessible to all firms
IOne study identifies twenty-two "significant" tech-
nolo_]ical advances that were transferred from the military
to civil aeronautics during the 1925-1972 period. See
R&D Contributions to Aviation Progress, (RADCAP), U.S.
De_artment of Commerce, Vol. I, Section III.
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Exhibit III-2
EXAMPLES OF CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT AND
TECHNOLOGIES APPROPRIATED FROM
MILITARY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS
Engines: The turbofan engine introduced on the B-707 was
originally designed by Rolls Royce for the Vickers VI000
military aircraft, which was never built. In addition, the
J-57 (Pratt & Whitney), Avon and Conway (Rolls Royce), and
J-79 (General Electric) engines were all originally developed
for military use.
B-707: The Boeing 707 was developed jointly with the KC-135
military tanker.
Wide-Body Aircraft: The DC-10, L-1011, and B-747 were all
developed based on technological research into wide-body
aircraft made by Douglas, Lockheed, and Boeing while competing
for what became the C-5A military transport contract.
DC-8: Initial engine was the J-57, originally developed
for military use. In addition, the wing geometry was based
on desiqns from the B-47, B-52, and B-66.
6O
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Exhibit III-3
EXAMPLES OF APPROPRIATION BY ONE CIVILIAN FIRM
OF TECHNOLOGY FIRST USED BY ANOTHER FIRM
(WITHIN THE AERONAUTICS INDUSTRY)
DC-3/B-247: In the early 1930's, TWA and United Airlines
were in fierce competition for the transcontinental mail
and passenger market. Both had extensive experience in
meta_ twin-engined aircraft through competition,_or mili-
tary contracts. Boeing introduced its 247 first (1933)
and Douglas, following the basic layout of the B-247,
improved upon it with its DC-2 (1934) and DC-3 (1936).
Tricycle Landing Gear: Originally, these landing gear
were incorporated into aircraft because they made take-
off and landing easier, and reduced the runway length
required. The DC-4E (1938) was the first airliner to
incorporate the concept once it was proven on several
earlier aircraft.
KC-135/707 Design: Based on their experience with the
B-47, B-52, and KC-135 military programs, Boeing was
emboldened to change military designs to civilian designs.
This basic external design was adopted by Douglas and
Convair two years later because they wanted to avoid the
risk of failing to find an alternative design that was
better. 61
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(as well as potential entrants to the industry). A more
interesting policy issue is the degree to which NASA-type
R&T would be appropriable if these projects were conducted
in the private sector. The character of R&T currently
conducted is basically neutral, however. As was already
mentioned, NASA supports discipline and applied research
in addition to making contributions to the industries'
infratechnology. As the discussion in the preceding section
of this report indicated, these elements of the technology
base are **eutral. Moreover, it is difficult to patent dis-
coveriec of these types, given their disembodied nature.
Even privately sponsored R&T is not, in general,
totally appropriable by single firms. Exhibit III-3
provides some examples of cases in which basic designs of
cemmercial aircraft were copied by industry rivals. The
privately sporsored R&T is generally only appropriable by
the innovating firm to the extent that the benefits of a
lead time over rivals are realized. In some cases, however,
this lead time is relatively short (for example, the
basic design of the B-707).
An additional issue in the realm of the appropriation
(or perhaps, more properly, transfer) of R&T is the application
of aeronautical technology to other industries. For
example, advances in the technology of turbine engines
have led to wider use of turbines in the generation of
Gellman Research As_'_ates. Inc..
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electrical power for peak periods and for use on a standby
basis. Turbines have also been adapted to pipeline technology,
and are now being used in chemical processing (see Exhibit III-
4). In these cases, the benefits of technologies transferred
to other industries cannot be appropriated by a single firm
in the aeronautical industry.
Indeed, technology from the U.S. aeronautical industry
is sometimes first transferred to foreign-based industries.
Describing a visit to a Japanese steel plant, Robert Dean
writes:
Let me give an example. When I visited
Mitsui in Japan, I was proudly shown a new and
very large, 50,000 kilowatt, blast furnace
blower. I examined it closely and discovered
an enormous example of a modern aircraft engine's
axial compressor with every stator row adjustable
for peak performance and flexibility. It was
obvious, on inspection and upon querying the
Japanese engineers, that they had been dedicated
students of U.S. aircraft engine technology.
And Mitsui had spent several years and a large
amount of money developing this highly commendable
machine which I predict we will soon see penetrating
the U.S. market. z
In general, technology transfers flow in both directions;
that is, technologies developed in other industries may
be borrowed by firms in the aeronautics industry. In
2Robert D. Dean, Jr. "The Temporal Mismatch--Innovation's
Pace vs Management's Tinge Horizon," Research Management,
May, 1974, pp. 14-15.
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Exhibit III-4
EXAMPLES OF TECHNOLOGIES WHICH CAN BE
USED IN THE CIVILIAN AERONAUTICAL
INDUSTRY AND OTHER INDUSTRIES
Microelectronics: Development of semiconductors for
missile guidance systems and the advent of small computers
have been applied to commercial aviation in such areas as
communications, radar, and on-board computers providing
improved navigation and maneuvering.
Metallurgy: Metallurgic science has been essential to
the development of alloys for use in monocque airframe
and high-temperature turboprop and jet engines.
High Octane Fuel: Improvements by oil companies in the
octane ratings of aviation fuel have spurred improvements
in gasoline for use in automobiles.
Computer Software: The NASA Structural Analysis (NASTRAN)
software package, developed by the Goddard Space Flight
Center to analyze the static and dynamic behavior of elastic
structures, has been applied in the civil aviation industry
as well as automobile production, bridge construction, and
plant modelling.
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Exhibit III-4, (Cont'd)
Turbine Engines: Advances in the technology of turbine
engines led to wider use of turbines in the qeneration of
electric power and in chemical processing.
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other cases, technology may be borrowed partially from
other sources and partially developed by the aeronautics
industry itself. For example, the aeronautics industry
clearly borrows technology in materials characteristics
(e.g., metallurgy) and still makes contribution of its
own _.g., the NASA materials programs at Langley). In
short, many industries may share a common technological base,
each drawing upon a common pool of information, and each
making its own contributions to the pool (see Exhibit III-4).
In these cases, no single firm in any one industry is
able to capture or appropriate the total benefits derived
from its own R&T projects. Further documentation of the
wide or diverse technology base in the aeronautics industry
is provided later in this report. The implications of
such a technology base are also discussed.
An Application of the Partial Appropriability Model to
the Civil Aeronautics R&T Market
The general economic model for the market for private
R&T that was described earlier focuses on two characteristics
of the market. These are:
o The appropriability of private R&T,
o The profit maximizing behavior of private firms.
The discussion that follows describes the civil
aeronautics industry in terms of these characteristics.
Gellman Resurch _so(_tes. Int.
Appropriability of Private R&D
The various sources of R&T for the civil aeronautics
industry have been identified and described earlier in
this report. The relative appropriability of each of the
various sources was also discussed. Here, the discussion
focuses on privately financed R&T.
Appropriation Through Patents
There are indications that private R&T in the industry
is only partially appropriable. First, a patent-sharing
arrangement--administered by the Manufacturers' Aircraft
Association (MAA)_currently exists in the aircraft manufactur-
ing industry. Under this arrangement, no member may have a
monopoly on any patent, regardless of whether a member was
responsible for the invention or the patent was obtained
through a licensing agreement with a non-member. Most patents
pooled under the MAA can be obtained by any member free of
royalty payments. Approximately one in twenty is judged
to hold exceptional incentive merit--by a panel of
3
arbitrators--and token royalties are paid for these.
Obviously then, benefits of inventions cannot be appropriated
by single firms under this institutional arrangement.
3For a more detailed description of the MAA agreement,
see Ronald Miller and David Sawers, The Technological
Develo[_ment of Modern Aviation, Routledge and Kegan Paul,
London, 1968, pp. 255-257.
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What is even more interesting, however, is the mere
existence of the patent-pooling arrangement. At a minimum,
it indicates a lack of faith in the patent system as
vehicle through which the benefits of R&T may be appropriated.
This, of course, is not surprising. First, much of the
technology base of the industry is, by nature, disembodied;
earlier comments have described the difficulty of appropriating
this type of technology through the patent system. Second,
and perhaps more importantly, the development of an aircraft
requires the synthesis of a wide range of interdependent
technologies. A proliferation of patents could produce
the heterogeneous product market that was described earlier
in this report (i.e., the production of several mediocre,
but no superior aircraft). This would clearly be to the
detriment of the entire industry. Finally, the MAA agreement
eliminates the need for expensive patent litigation among
industr, members.
It is clear that the industry patent-sharing agreement
creates incentives for secrecy in the industry. The only
advantage here, however, is leadtime. Secrecy cannot be
maintained indefinitely when final products are open for
dissection by rivals once they are exposed in the market.
In fact, a long history of rivalry through imitation
exists in the industry. Several examples of technological
imitation are provided in Exhibit III-5.
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The upshot is that the assumption of the partial
appropriability of private R&T that was embedded in the
earlier economic model is relevant to the civil aeronautics
market. Recall that it was assumed that the R&T of each
firm affected the productivity of every other firm in the
industry, but each firm's own R&T had a greater impact on
its own productivity than on the productivity of competitors.
Specifically, in terms of the civil aeronautics industry,
a firm conducting R&T and adopting the benefits of its
own research through innovation has the advantage of lead
time over its competitors. Each individual firm, however,
cannot capture the full benefits of many of its own R&T
activities since innovations can be copied by its competitors.
Profit-Maximizing Behavior
A conventional assumption embedded in standard economic
anlaysis is that firms behave in a manner consistent with
profit maximization. There is no apparent reason to believe that
firms in the civil aeronautics industry behave otherwise.
It should be recognized that it is sufficient that firms
attempt to maximize profits--i.e., the conclusions hold,
even if firms are sometimes unsuccessful in maximizing
profits, as long as the profit motive dictates their
decisionmaking behavior. At any rate, the assumption of
70
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profit-maximizing behavior appears to be both reasonable
and appropriate. 4
Overview of Applicability of the Economic Model
to the Civil Aeronautics Industry
The foregoing discussion suggests that the assumptions
embedded in the economic model are appropriate in terms
of describing the conduct and structure of the civil
aeronautics industry. This holds for both of the key
assumptions--appropriability of R&T and profit-maximizing
behavior.
it follows, then, that the general conclusions regarding
imperfections in the market for privately funded R&T will
hold specifically for the civil aeronautics industry.
Most importantly, the civil aeronautics industry will
tend to underallocate resources to private R&T. Firms in
the industry will conduct less private R&T than the socially
optimal level (i.e., less than the level that would occur
absent market imperfections).
Market Structure
AI_E_ropriation difficulties will cause an underinvestment
in R&T by private firms in the civil aeronautics industry.
Below, tht_ potential impacts of market structure on the level
of l_'I' cff_rts art, reviewed.
4More precisely, it is required that firms attempt
to maximize long-run profits (i.e., maximize the net
[)r_,sent value of the firm).
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A Description of the Civil Aeronautics Industry:
Market Structure
The structure of the civil aeronautics industry can
be characterized as having a relatively high degree of
horizontal concentration, but a lack of vertical integration.
Horizontal concentration describes the number of firms
participating in the market at any one stage of production
(e.g., airframes or engines). Vertical integration refers
to the extent to which single firms participate in the
market at several stages of production (e.g., a firm
producing both airframes and engines is vertically integrated).
Firm Size and Market Share
In Section II of this report, tentative evidence
that both firm size and seller concentration affect R&T
efforts was described. Specifically, the evidence sugges_
that increases in firm size resulted in proportionately
greater levels of R&T effort; beyond the threshold point
(about $400 million in sales in 1978 dollars), however,
further increases in firm sales caused diminished levels
of R&D.
Similarly, increases in market concentration tend to
caus_ proportionately greater R&D to be undertaken. Again,
however this effect diminishes at some threshold point--namely,
the, [_oint at which 50 to 60 percent of the market was
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controlled by the four largest firms in the industry. However,
the evidence is relatively weak on both accounts. Accordingly,
the conclusions offered below should be viewed with this in mind.
The civil aeronautics industry exceeds, by large magnitudes,
the threshold points for both firm size and market concentration.
The three largest airframe manufacturers, Boeing, McDonnell-
Douglas, and Lockheed, for example, had 1981 total sales revenues
5
of $9,788, $7,385, and $5,176 million, respectively. Similarly,
the marketshare of just the largest commercial airframe manu-
facturer, Boeing, exceeds 60 percent of the market for large
aircraft. Thus, by both standards, the industry is far past
the optimal threshola points condusive to R&T activities. Be-
cause of this, and in view of the inconclusive evidence re-
garding the general effects of firm size and marketshare, these
aspects of marketshare are not likely to mitigate the appro-
priability problems facing the industry.
Product Diversity
It was also mentioned in Section II that firms producing
products in closely related markets may have added incentives
to conduct R&D because the benefits can be spread over several
products. The existence of a large military market aids the
industry in spreading the costs of the common military/civilian
R&T base. But, the key question here is: whether the exist-
ence of the military market causes firms to undertake civilian-
oriented R&T, speculatinq that the results can be applied in
the military sector? While this effect may exist,
>Annual Reports for Boeing, McDonnell-Douqlas, and
Lockheed.
73 Gellman Research Associates. Inc.
it is likely to be small. Military and civilian hardware tend
to be quite different in performance characteristics with
military applications usually preceding civilian use. Dis-
embodied technologies--new concepts or knowledge--may be applic-
able in either sector, but the production of such R&T will be
subject to the appropriability problem, regardless of its
eventual use.
Other Sources of R&T
The discussion provided immediately above has inten-
tionally focused on privately funded R&T. Considered here
are incentives private firms in the industry would have to
fund R&T that is currently derived from other sources. In
general, the types of R&T provided by other sources are, by
their very nature, less appropriable than privately con-
ducted R&T which is dominated by applied research and develop-
ment activities. Consequently, private firms will have,
in general, even less incentive to conduct R&T currently
derived from other sources.
R&T currently conducted by NASA is, of course, the
present issue. The critical question is: to what extent
will private firmshave incentives to conduct R&T currently
performed or sponsored by NASA? As an R&T source, NASA
makes contributions to the industry's technology base in
terms of infratechnoloqy, and discipline and applied
research. Relatively little private expenditure is devoted
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to these elements of the technology base. The reasons
for this phenomenon are twofold:
o Private firms have less incentive to conduct
discipline and applied R&T because of the
problems of appropriab_lity (as well as the
risk and payback period problems).
o Neutral technology can be obtained from
other sources.
The latter point, of course is the central policy issue.
Given the previous discussion on the appropriability of
neutral technology and the results obtained from the
economic model of the market for R&T, it appears that
the private market will not respond well to the burden
of undertaking R&T activities currently conducted by NASA.
A second issue is whether NASA sponsored R&T
conducted by private firms is a complement or a substitute
for privately financed R&T. The concern here is that
NASA (or government) sponsored R&T "crowds out" R&T that
would otherwise be financed and conducted privately. A
priori expectations lead one to believe that the crowding
out effect is not substantial: NASA typically sponsors
projects that exhibit scientific potential rather than
short-term commercial potential. In addition, there is
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empirical evidence that the crowding out effect is minimal.
One study, which focused specifically on the transport
industry, estimated that each dollar cf government sponsored
"mission-oriented" research reduced privately sponsored
6
research by only eight cents.
NASA Sponsored R&T: Risk and the Payback Period
AppropriabJlity is not the only factor considered in
a firm's decision to invest in R&T. Specifically, both
the level of risk associated with a project and the duration
of the payback period influence the investment decision,
even when appropriability is not an issue. Development
activities are least risky and have, in general, the shortest
payback period, while investments in discipline (or basic)
research and infratechnology are generally most risky and
have the longest payback periods.
Regarding the risk and payback period problems, the
important issue here is: does the type of R&T conducted
by NASA complement R&T (or R&D) that private firms tend
to conduct, or are NASA R&T activities substitutes. Many
6j. Charmicheal, "The Effects of Mission-Oriented
Public R&D Spending on Private Industry," Journal of
Finance, 36 June 1981, pp. 617-627.
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of NASA's resources are devoted to basic research and the
development of infratechnology. These activities complement
the efforts of the private sector since they are both
risky and tend to have one long payback period.
NASA also sponsors and conducts applied research.
Although this type of R&T investment is generally less of
a problem in terms of risk and the payback period, it is
less desirable to private firms than development activities.
Moreover, applied research in aeronautics, particularly
the type that NASA conducts, often requires the _xtensive
use of large scale facilities. If the burden of conducting
these projects were placed on the Private sector, substantial
duplication of both large scale facilities and expensive
experiments may result.
Dynamic Extensions of the Model: A Historical View of
Technological Rivalry and Other Observations
There are three refinements of the model that are
necessary to characterize more fully the aeronautics
industry. The refinements address the following issues:
o The monopsony buying power which is sometimes
invested in airlines as a result of direct
competition between aircraft manufacturers.
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o The role of the dominant firm and its effects
on competition and technological change.
o The significant intervention in the marketplace
by the military.
Each of these facets of the aeronautics industry is considered
below.
Monopsony Power of Airlines
Because aircraft manufacturing requires high development
costs, the industry is often compared to other industries
with high development costs--e.g., automobiles. The key
distinction is that aircraft are built in small numbers
and, in fact, are custom-built to airline specifications.
Stability in the marketplace depends upon the ability of
firms to differentiate their products and, more specifically,
to build different size aircraft with different capabilities
which will be attractive to specific niches in the marketplace.
When firms build aircraft of the same size with similar
capabilities, they find that the market is too small to
yield satisfactory returns on their investments. Competition
becomes so vigorous for limited sales opportunities that
airlines acquire a form of monopsony power--the ability
to dictate the terms of the sale to the seller. This
78
C_lhnam Re_mm_'h ,'k4modWt_. Inc.
i .
J
l
t
1
situation can have debilitating effects upon t_e competitors,
and can reinforce the already existing tendency for one
firm to emerge as the dominant competitor during any
given era.
The Effects of a Dominant Firm
Firms have become dominant in the industry when they
have been successful in making significant technological
leaps forward. Boeing's dominance over the past twenty-
five years can be directly traced to its introduction of
the 707 which, although it was not the first turbojet
introduced, was the first to combine both speed and cost
savings for its operators. Similarly, the DC-I-2-3 series
dominated airline fleets worldwide in the 1930's. The
DC-3 combined advantages in speed, size, range, and cost.
What is most significant about these two success
stories is that both Douglas in the 1930's and Boeing in
the 1950's were minor competitors in the civil aeronautics
business when they undertook their projects. In fact,
the DC-]-2-3 series was the first air transport Douglas
ever built. History suggests that dominant firms in the
airframe industry will be reluctant to make technological
leaps forward because they do not wish to compete with
their existing and successful product lines and their
incentives to undertake the considerable risks involved
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are less than those of companies with less of a stake in
the existing market for aircraft.
In other words, dominant firms become dominant by
successfully making significant technological breakthroughs
first. They remain dominant by winning any direct competition
with other major manufacturers--e.g., the 707 vs. DC-8
and the DC-3 vs. the B-247--and by successfully differentiating
products--e.g., the 727 and the 747. But they can lose
their dominance by under-investing in technological advances
and the R&T necessary to support them.
It should be stressed that incorporating a major
technological advantage is no guarantee of success. The
de Haviland Comet, the Vickers V-1000, and the Concorde
are examples of failed attempts by relatively minor competitors
to make technological breakthroughs.
In reviewing these histories of major technological
breakthroughs, it is important to recognize the role
played by externally generated technology. The DC-3
incorporated a number of innovations first developed
elsewhere: the NACA cowling; all metal, stress monoplane
structures; and variable pitch propellers (invented in
1871). The inability of the original investors to appropriate
8O
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all of the benefits of the technologies made the DC-3
possible. Likewise, the KC-135/B-707 was based upon
Boeing experience with the B-47 and B-52, both military
aircraft.
The findings concerning the incentives of dominant
firms to under-invest in major technological advances and
the R&T necessary to support them is consistent with the
economic literature. A brief summary of that literature
would indicate that:
i. Some concentration in an industry may be conducive
to invention and innovation because the firms
will have sufficient financial capabilities to
undertake these activities and because they
have an incentive to differentiate their product
and thereby earn some monopoly profits; but,
2. High concentration (the case of the dominant
firm) can retard progress by restricting the
number of independent initiatives and by dampening
the incentives of other firms to compete;
3. The key to preserving effective competition in
less-than-perfectly-competitive industries is
to keep entry barriers sufficiently low so that
newcomers can enter or threaten to enter.
81
Ge.Jlman Rexa_.h Asm_Lu. Inc.
4. Access to radical new technologies (and the
complementary technologies to support them) is
a key to preserving low entry barriers and
competition especially in high technology
industries.
The Role of Military Intervention
One of the keys to preserving the role of the "newcomer"
(the firm seeking to make significant technological break-
throughs) in the aeronautics industry in the United States
is that all firms participate in military procurement as
either prime or subcontractors. Military R&D expenditures
as a percent of total federal aeronautics R&D swamp those
of civilian agencies, accounting for over 70 percent of the
7
total. The importance of these military procurements in
the development of jet aircraft--e.g., 707, L-1011, DC-10,
747--should not be underestimated. However, even military
procurements of a specific type tend to become concentrated,
especially as the cost of developing new weapon systems
continues to accelerate. This can have carry over effects
into the commercial sector. For example, in the early 1950's
Boeing had significant technological and cost advanteages
over Douglas and the British firms because of their previous
work in the B-47 and B-52.
In sum, military procurement can effectively subsidize
commercial ventures just as any large customer's purchases
7Aerospace Facts and Figures 1981/1982, Aerospace
Industries Association of America, Inc. A_ugust 1981).
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can affect the viability of a firm. Such carryover effects
can influence competition in the commercial market, and can
have distributional consequences in the commercial sector
that are independent of public policy. Seen in this light,
military procurement can simultaneously preserve the role
of the newcomer and help to create or maintain the position
of a dominant firm.
Risk in the civil Aeronautics Industry
A significant policy change whereby the private
civil aeronautics industry would be required to bear the
burden of conducting R&T currently conducted or sponsored
by NASA would add considerable risk in the private sector.
One way to evaluate the potential impacts of this additional
risk is to assess the level of risk that currently faces
the industry.
Certainly the financial difficulties that surfaced
with Douglas in 1967 and Lockheed in 1971 atest to the
already risky nature of the business. As J. R. Woody
puts it:
The development and production of highly
technical new aircraft requires immense financial
investments, high production costs, and uncertain
delayed returns due to lengthy development and
production lead times. The very nature of the
product then, has inherent business risks.
Whenever airframe producers utilize borrowed
funds, these business risks evolve into financial
risks as well... Defense airframe demand surges
during periods of war but shrivels afterwards,
:ind the cyclical nature of commercial aircraft
demand further amplifies these fluctuations.
uJ
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Highly variable sales, magnified by financial
leverage, heightens fluctuations in profits and
intensifies financial risk.
The aerospace industry must also contend
with rapidly advancing technology and costs...
There are innate risks associated with developing
and producing airframes which incorporate new
and often untried technology. The emphasis on
research and development in the airframe industry
is a two edged sword with respect to financial
risk, it is costly, and the returns from R&D
are highly uncertain. 8
Earlier, in Section II of this report it was shown that
risk could be mitigated if a firm could diversify its activities
into several relatively small projects, even if the total
level of R&D is relatively high. On the other hand, if
the nature of the industry is such that R&D diversification
is infeasible, then the risk problem becomes more significant.
The nature of the civil aeronautics industry is, of
course, such that very large single R&D projects must be
undertaken. Development costs for the 747, for example,
have been estimated at $1.2 billion dollars spanning roughly
a 3 year period between December 1965 to January 1970. 9
At the time the development of the aircraft commenced, in
late 1965, total shareholder's equity was only about $372
8j. R. Woody, _ the Financial Risk of
Major Airframe ManuEacturers, Ph.D. D_ssertat,-_, The
Colgate Darden School of Business Administration, University
of Virginia, December 1980, pp. 151-152.
qRADCAP, O_. Cit., Appendix 9, p. 21.
84
Gdman Research AsK.dat_. Inc.
million_ 0 The ratio of development costs to equity was
approximately 3.23; that is, the development cost of the
747 alone was more than 3 times the value of stockholders'
investments. In short, Boeing was required--literally--to
"bet" the company on the success of the 747.
McDonnell-Douglas incurred similar risks in developing
the DC-10. Development costs for this aircraft have been
estimated at $I.I billion. II The value of shareholders
equity was only about $364 million in 1967, the year in
which development commenced, i2 The ratio of development
costs to equity was about 3.02. McDonnell-Douglas then,
was also required to risk the fate of the firm in developing
the DC-10.
As the above discussion demonstrates, it is not
possible for large aircraft manufacturers to mitigate
risk by accepting numerous relatively small R&D projects.
The development of large aircraft requires these firms to
commit to large R&D programs in excess of the value of
the firm. This is in contrast to the drug industry, for
example, where average development costs have been estimated
at approximately $I0 million per chemical entity--less
10Boeing1 Annual Report.
II
[b_DCAP, O__. Cit., Appendix 9, p. 21.
_McDonr_ell-Douglas Annual Report.
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than one percent of unit development costs for large
13
aircraft--during the late 1960's.
The degree of risk facing manufacturers of large
aircraft is best put in perspective through a comparison
with other industries. One appropriate measure is devel-
opment costs as a percent of average annual sales. These
figures are 8.5 and 5.4 percent, respectively, for the 747
and the DC-10. 14 These figures can then be compared with
similar data for other industries.
Business Week's 1981 annual survey of R&D expenditures
indicates that average R&D as a percent of sales for all
15
manufacturing industries was only 2 percent; it should
be stressed that this figure includes all projects under-
taken by firms included in the survey. Thus, the single
projects undertaken by Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas were
several multiples of the average for all projects for
these industries in terms of R&D expenditures as a percent
13Scherer, Op. cir., Industrial Market Structure and
Economic Performance, p. 421.
14These figures were computed by first dividing devel-
opment costs b_' the development period--assumed to be seven
years in both cases which allows inclusion of development
costs after commercial introduction--and then dividing
averaqe annual development costs by annual sales at the
date of development commencement (1965 and 1967 for the
747 and DC-10). Sales figures wer£ obtained from annual
reports.
15"Annual Scoreboard of R&D Spending," Business Week,
July 5, 1982, p. 74.
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of sales. In fact, the highest ranked industry--semi-
16
conductors--averaged R&D expenditures of only 7.1 percent.
Again, this comparison includes only single aircraft projects,
versus all projects for the comparison group.
Firms that are required to face substantial risks
are typically compensated by higher profits; in other
words, in order to accept a risky project, the expected
net return on the project must be higher than those for
less risky projects. Such has not been the historical
trend for firms in the aeronautics industry, however.
J. R. Woody writes:
... aerospace profits have been less than those
for manufacturing corporations in general,
despite the relatively higher risks of producing
aerospace products. With r6turns not commensurate
with their risks, airframe producers have more
difficulty obtaining the necessary external
financing to operate. 17
The profitability trend for aerospace firms--measured as
after-tax returns as a ratio of bcth equity and sales--is
illustrated in Exhibit III-7 for the period spanning the
1960's and 1970's. By these measures, aerospace firms
lag behind all other manufacturing firms.
16
Ibid., p. 73
17j. R. Woody, Op. cir., p. 153.
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Another measure of the relative financial risk con-
fronting the aeronautics industry is a comparison of long-
term debt/equity ratios with other manufacturing firms.
This comparison is illustrated in Exhibit III-8. Briefly,
this figure indicates that this ratio has been about 50
percent higher for aerospace firms over the two-decade
period spanning the 1960's and 1970's. These figures
suggest the aeronautics firms are already financially
risky, and may have difficulty in obtaining capital to
finance additional risky R&T projects.
Briefly summarizing, there is strong evidence that
firms in the aeronautics industry already face relatively
large risks. Given this fact, they are not likely to be
able to respond well to the task of bearing additional
burdens, especially for relatively risky projects that
have been sponsored and conducted by NASA. The effects of
risk are therefore parallel to and reinforce those due
to the appropriability problem: firm resources are most
likely to be devoted to these activities closest to commer-
cialization.
Summary
Access to non-appropriable technologies from other
sources--e.g., NASA--appears to be critical to the main-
tenance of efficient production of civilian transports
for the following reasons:
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aAerospace Industries Association of American, Inc.
Financial Profile of the U.S. _ Industry, 1960-1973
(Washington, D.C. D-ec_-_er--l§74) p. 28, citing FTC
Financial Report for All ManufacturinCor rations, fourth
quarter data.
b1974-1975 data from FTC, _ Financial
All Manuf_orations, fourth quar--_ d-_a.
CReturn on Equity (ROE) is defined as Net Income.
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dReturn on Sales (ROS) is defined as Net Income
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SOURCE: J. R. Woody, op. __cit'' p. 45.
8_ (klmm, R_A_w_W_._l,_
Percent I
.60 -
Exhibit III-8
LONG TERM DEBT/EQUITY RATIOS a
AEROSPACE AND ALL MANUFACTURING
1969-1975 D'c
•5O
.40
.3O
•20 -
.10 "
1968 1970 1972 1974 1976
Aerospace
All Manufacturers
Year
aLong Term Debt/Equity Ratio is defined as Lon@ Term Debt.
Stockholder's Equity
bAerospace Industries Association of America, Inc., Finan-
cial Profile of the U.S. Aerospace Industry, 1960-1973 (Washing-
ton, D.C., December 1974) p. A-10, citing FTC Quarterly Financial
Report for All Manufacturin@ Corporations, fourth quarter data.
c1974-1975 data from FTC, Quarterly Financial Report for
All Manufacturing Corporations, fourth quarter data.
SOURCE: C. R. Woody, op. __cit'' p. 46
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o Firms in general have a tendency to underinvest
[ in R&T, for all the reasons cited previously.
_ o The existence of dominant firms tends to impede
technological progress and competition.
_
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The financial capacity of aeronautics manufacturers
is sometimes debilitated by the monopsony power
of airlines.
The intervention of the military through its
procurement and R&T programs can have significant
carryover effects in the commercial sector, and
in fact can give one firm a competitive
advantage--e.g., Boeing in the case of the 707.
Aeronautics firms already face substantial
risks relative to other manufacturers. The
industry is not likely to be able to respond
well to the burden of accepting additional
risky R&T projects.
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IV. HIGH TECHNOLOGY AND WIDE TECHNOLOGY BASE:
THE CASE OF AERONAUTICS
The key conclusion to be drawn from the partial
appropriability model is that market imperfections can
cause private firms to underinvest in R&T activities. As
a result, output will be more costly to produce and/or
the quality of output will be lower than would otherwise
be feasible. From a public policy standpoint, underinvestment
in R&T may be a particularly serious problem in high-
technology industries because:
o These industries tend to grow faster than typical
industries in the United States, and, moreover,
often provide key inputs used by other industries
to increase productivity.
o Many of the high-technology industries also
depend heavily on a wide range of inputs from
other high-technology industries. {We will
refer to such industries as having a "wide
high-technology base.") As a result, underinvestment
in R&T in one high-technology industry can slow
productivity increases in others.
In this section, some of the special characteristics
of high-technology industries are outlined. In particular,
92
indicators of research intensity and measures of the
width of an industry's high-technology base are developed.
This review leads to a discussion of how high-technology
firms are exposed to the risk of underinvestn_ent, both in
their own R&T activities and in the R&T activities of
input industries. Finally, the special nature of aeronautics
is examined. Because it depends on so many high-technology
inputs, both from its own industry and other industries,
the chances are high that, in the absence of government
intervention, aeronautics firms will produce less than
socially optimal p_oducts because of underinvestment in
R&T somewhere in the economy. :b_ key implication of
this finding is that government intervention in aeronautics
R&T markets should cut across industry boundaries to
include research ir other industries which are likely to
underinvest in R&T areas that are relevant to aeronautics.
The Imp_ortance of High-Technology Industries in the U.S.
In a recent study prepared for the Cabinet Council
on Commerce and Trade, I several distinguishing characteristics
of high-technology industries were discussed. Of particular
Icabinot Council on Commerce and Trade; "An Assescment
of U.S. Competitiveness in High-Technology Industries, "
Findl Draft Report {May 19, 1982).
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importance to the present study is the fact that the
high-technology industries in the United States in the
period 1970-1980 exhibited a growth in real output of
7 percent in contrast with the 3 percent growth rate
exhibited by total U.S. business. Complementary figures
concerning the rate of inflation, trade balance, and
employment growth all indicate that high-technology industries
have out-performed the rest of the U.S. economy. These
facts by themselves tend to indicate that high-technology
industries are special, but their implications for the
present study should be reviewed in some detail.
By significantly out-performing the rest of the U.S.
economy in terms of growth of output, high-technology
industries have made a disproportionately large contribution
to what economists term "social welfare. = Specifically,
the high rates of technological innovation in these Industrie_
have led to decreased costs, increased quallty of products,
_ncreased corporate profits, and increased consumer satisfaction.
One way to examine how the benefits from technological
innovation are distributed to both consumers and producers
is to compare the social rate of return on innovations
with the private r te realized by the innovator. At
least two studies in this vein have been completed. The
social and private rates of return for industrial innovations
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from both studies are shown in Exhibit IV-I. A quick
perusal of this exhibit will show that, in generalw the
social rate of return exceeds the private rate of return
on innovation by a wide margin. In fact, the median
social rate of return is 71 percent while the median
private rate of return on innovation is 24.5 percent.
There are, of course, exceptions to this trend, but in
general one can conclude that society benefits more from
innovation than is indicated by the returns to the innovating
firm.
It is instructive to review what is included in the
private and social rates of return. The private rate of
return to the innovating firm includes:
o the net cash flow attributable to the innovation,
minus
o profit lost from displaced products, minu____._s
o a proportional share of R&D that never makes a
commercial contribution, (-uncommercialized
R&D").
The private rate of return, therefore, is net of the
profits that otherwise would have been earned if the R&D
that led to the innovation had not been undertaken, and
also assigns an R&D overhead to the innovation in the
form of a proportionate share of the costs of uncommercialized
R&D •
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ORIGINAL PAGE 18
OF POOR  ALmr
SOCIAL AND PRIVATE RA'A'L£ OF RETURN FROM
INVESTMENT IN 30 INNOVATIONS
Innovations
Rate of return
in percent Innovation
Rate of return
in Percent
Social
Primary metals 17_
innovation
Machine tool 83
innovation
Component for 29
control system
Construction 96
mater_al
Drilling 54
material
Drafting 92
innovation
Paper 82
innovation
Thread 307
innovation
Door-control 27
innovation
New electronic negative
device
Chcmical 71
product
Chemical 32
process A
Chemical 13
process B
Major Chemical 56
process
Private
18% Industrial
product A
35 Industrial
product B
? Industrial
Product C
9 Industrial
product D
16 Industrial
product E
47 Industrial
product F
42 Industrial
product G
27 Industrial
product H
37 Industrial
product I
negative Industrial
product J
9 Industrial
product K
25 Industrial
product L
4 Industrial
process R
31 Industrial
process S
Industrial
process T
M,'(:i In rates of return
Industrial
process II
Social Private
-TTTTT-.
Social Private
62% 31t
negative negative
116 55
23 0
37 9
161 40
123 24
104 negative
113 12
95 40
472 127
negative 13
103 55
29 25
198 69
20 20
Col_mn (I]:
Column (2):
Man_fiold (et ,iI} "Social and Private Rates of Return
from Indu_tridi Innovations" QJE March 1977
Tewk_bury (et at) "YeasurLnq tho 3oc_tal _e1,,fi_s
of [nno':3t ton" _cl,,nc.7 8/8/80
Ro.:; irtlc;,d us,,d Ldent_cal .,stim,_tion_ ,ind ,l_ta coll,,ctson technilros.
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The social rate of return includes the following:
o the private rate of return,
o net profits of firms which imitate the innovation,
o savings to consumers that result from the innovation,
plus or minus
o any other benefits or costs attributable to
externalities--e.g., effects on the environment,
health, safety, etc., minus
o profits lost on displaced products of firms
other than the original innovator, minus
o a proportionate share of uncommercialized R&D
overhead of firms other than the innovator.
The social benefits therefore include the net benefits
(or losses) to all producers and to all consumers in the
economy.
While the sample of social rates of return to innovation
is limited and not directly linked to high-technology
industries, it does illustrate how the benefits of technological
innovation are distributed to both consumers and producers.
Because high-technology industries tend to grow much
faster than do other industries, it follows that their
contribution to "social welfare" through innovation has
also been disproportionately significant relative to the
contribution of all other industries.
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Having established their importance to the U.S.
economy, what remains to be explained is how high-technology
industries can be affected by market imperfections which
reduce the incentives of firms to conduct R&T activities.
This discussion depends upon developing measures of high-
technology embodied in the output of industries and upon
measures of the width of the technology base of these
industries.
Measures of High Technology
The study conducted by the Cabinet Council on Commerce
and Trade 2 developed a series of measures of high-technology
based upon research intensity. The most direct measure
of research intensity of an industry used in that study
was the ratio of applied R&D funds to shipments of the
industry. However, this measure takes into a:count only
the research efforts of firms and governmental entities
involved in applied research and development in a particular
industry; it ignores the research and development efforts
made by other industries which supply inputs to the high-
technology industries.
2Op. Cit., Cabinet Council on Commerce and Trade.
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I This omission in measuring research intensity is
corrected in Exhibit IV-2. Here, research intensity
includes the cost of R&D (both private and public) embodied
in the inputs used by a particular industry. These estimates
were developed utilizing the Department of Commerce Input/Output
Model of the O.S. economy. Using the input/output tables,
it is possible to determine the value of inputs per dollar
of final output for a particular industry. Embodied in
each of the inputs is R&D expense. The R&D expense of
the inputs to a particular industry as a percent of the
value of output is defined as the total research intensity
of the industry.
The results of the analysis in Exhibit IV-2 show
that the aeronautics industry (aircraft and parts) is one
of the top-rated industries in terms of total research
intensity. Only guided missles and spacecraft (which
sells the majority of its output to the government) and
communications equipment and electronic components (a key
aeronautics industry supplier) are ranked higher.
The results of the analysis in Exhibit IV-2 indicate
that high-technology industries are dependent upon their
own R&T activities and the R&T activities of other industries
to produce innovations which lead to increases in output
and impro _ents in the quality of products. To the
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ORIGINAL PAGE IS
QuN.n'y
1
U.S. MANUFACTURERS RANKED BY TOTAL EMBODIED R&D&
THE DOC3 DEFINITION OF HIGH-TECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS _
r
SIC CLASS DESCRIPTION
TUTAL
INTENSITY 3
(PERCENT)
il
I
I
I
i
i
i
376
365, 366,
367
4
372,
357
348
283
281
Guided Missiles and spacecraft
Communications equipment and electronic
components
Aircraft and parts
Office, computing, and accounting
machines
Ordnance and accessories
Drugs and Medicines
Industrial inorganic chemicals
38 (excluding) Professional and scientific instruments
3825
351
282
Engines, turbines and parts
Plastic and synthetic materials
Weighted average all manufacturers
•63.86
16.04
15.40
13.65
13.64
8.37
8.23
5.70
5.49
5.42
3.30
1
2
3
4
The total of direct and indirect R&D expenditures.
High-technology products are defined as those having signifi-
cantly higher R&D embodied in them. Plashic and synthetic
materials have 30 percent more R&D embodied in them than
agricultural dlemicals (the next group of products in the
ranking).
Total R&D expenditures, both direct and indirect, as a percentage
of product shipments.
Aircraft and parts includes aircraft engines.
SOURCE : Davis, L.A. "Technology Intensity of U.S. Output and
Trade," Office of Trade and Investment Analysis, U.S.
Department of Commerce, February 1982.
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extent that these industries or their suppliers are char-
acterized by market imperfections which can lead to under-
investment in R&T, their performance, measured in terms of
output and quality changes, is at risk. Some of the elements
of that risk can be further elucidated by examining the
width of the technology base of these high-technology
industries.
Measures of the Width of Technology Bases
The risk that underinvestment in R&T will hurt an
industry depends not only upon the iacentives to conduct
R&T in that industry, but also on incentives which exist
in other industries. The wider the technology base of an
industry, the more it is "exposed" to the risk of under-
investment.
To examine how important the number of supplying
industries is to the research intensity of high-technology
industries, an analysis has been developed based upon the
1972 Input/Output Tables for the United States. 3 Shown
in Exhibit IV-3 is the input/output structure of the
high-technology sectors of the U.S. economy. The numbers
in the columns of this table are the value of inputs from
high-technology industries per dollar of final output of
3U.S. Department of Commerce: "The Detailed Input-
Output Structure of the U.S. Economy, 1972" (Volume I)
(1979).
i01
(_Jmen Remmch Am_ _
ii
° Ii{
_!i]
_!, . _ _._
102
Gelmm R_mrch/_Mmd_k I¢_
the high-_echnology industry shown in the column heading.
For example, the first entry at the top of the column
furthest to the left of the page indicates that 1.3_ of
the final output of guided missiles and space vehicles is
attributable to purchases from that same industry. The
entry just below indicates that .065¢ of inputs from the
ordinance and accessories industry is purchased per dollar
of output of the guided missiles and space vehicles industries.
But the numbers in this table, are less important
than the patterns of high technology inputs for different
z _ustries. The aircraft and parts industry (aeronautics)
purchases inputs from all other high-technology industries
with the exception of drugs and medicine. No other high
technology industry exhibits as much width in its high-
technolagy base. In contrast, for example, the engines
and turbines industry (which excludes aircraft engines)
is dependent upon only three other high-technology industries
for its high-technology inputs.
Another indication of the width of the high technology
base of the aeronautics industry is shown in Exhibit IV-
4. Here, the OSTP Aeronautics Policy Study Working Group
devised a classification of basic discoveries and innovations
in aeronautics and other industries which remain to be
exploited by the aeronautics industry. This exhibit
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emphasizes the large and groving role that electronic
devices (classified under microelectronics, large computers,
lasers and fiber o_tics) are likely to play in the advance
of aeronautics technology in the next 10 to 15 years.
This high dependence on electronic components is a relatively
new phenomenon and has resulted from fundamental advances
in the microelectronics, computing, and communications
and electronics components industries. This suggests
that the relative importance of supply industries in the
high technology base of the aeronautics industry tends to
change over time as the pace of technological change in
other industries accelerates o_ decelerates. This finding
suggests government R&T policy in the aeronautics industry
should be sensitive to changes in the industry's technology
base. In supply industries where underinvestment is
likely to occur, government intervention may be appropriate.
The aeronautics industry not only exhibits high
research intensity, but also is highly dependent on other
high technology industries for inputs. The chance is
greater that market imperfections in other high technology
industries will have a detrimental affect on the aeronautics
i_dustry than is the case for other high technology industries.
This finding is particularly important when one considers
the interdependence of inputs in the construction of
105
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aircraft. The unavailability or low quality of inputs
from certain key industries--e.g., electronic components--can
affect the design and performance of m_ny other aeronautics
systems. Seen in this way, market imperfections in other
industries can have an effect on the quality and cost of
aeronautics product_ which are disproportionately large
relative to the cost of the other-industry inputs.
Implications
A review of measures of research intensity and width
o£ the technology base for various industries has demon-
strated that the aeronautics industry is characterized
by high research intel_sity and a wide technology base.
That is, aeronautics depends upon R&T performed within
the aeronautics industry and on R&T performed by virtually
every other high technology industry. The implications
of these findings depend directly upon the appropriability
of R&T in the high-technology industries and on the appropriability
of R&T in the ±ndustries that supply them. In particular,
to the extent that there are market imperfections in
either the aeronautics industry or its high technology
supply industries, the performance of the aeronautics
Industry--measured in terms of growth of output and quality
of products--will be hampered.
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The dimensions of =exposure = to market imperfections
depends upon whether firms are able to appropriate the
benefits of R&T. Exhibit IV-I summarized findlngs
that showed that the median social rate of return
on innovation exceeds the private return to the innovation
by a wide margin. Admittedly, the social rate of return
figures include benefits to consumers which are seldom
capturable by the innovator. But, the social rate of
return also includes the positive profits of imitating
firms; the presence of these other-firm profits tends to
reduce the private marginal incentives to innovate. As a
result, firms will quite generally tend to underinvest in
R&T.
The effects of underinvestment in R&T are magnified
in high-technology industries where research intensity
and a wide and changing technology base play a major role
in the production process. The exposure to this problem
appears to be particularly acute in the aeronautics industry.
The key implication of this finding is that government
intervention in the aeronautics R&T market should cut
across industry boundaries to include research in other
areas which are likely to exhibit private underinvestment.
For example, many of the advances in materials science
that have been applied to aeronautics have been funded by
107
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the government. Such funding is Justified in cases where
metals fizms are unable to capture a significant portion
of the benefits derived from a technological advance.
This will often be the case because the demand for the
material is small relative to the benefits derived by
aeronautics firms and their customers.
1
108
Oellmm Research Auoc_es. Inc
II
I
J
I
V. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
For the most part, the analysis has focused on the
problem firms in general, and aeronauticR firms in partic-
ular, have in appropriating the benefits from their activities.
To the extent that there are imperfections in the market
for aeronautics R&T or for R&T embodied in inputs used by
aeronautics, there is a rationale for market intervention
by the government. The question addressed in this chapter
is: what type or types of market intervention (if any)
should the government use to correct the market imperfections.
Based on a review of several policy options, the "as
is" scenario is preferred. The "as is" scenario contemplates
the retention of the current institutional relationship
between NASA and the civil aeronautics industry. This
recommendation does not address the scale issue--that is,
the specific level at which NASA should be operated.
Rather, the conclusion is that the potential consequences
of any major change in the Instltutional relationship
between NASA and the industry are undesirable. There is
one area of concern: changes in the current arrangement
regarding user charges at NASA facilities may improve
efficiency. A more complete discussion of this issue
is provided later in this chapter.
]09
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Obviously, any public policy recommendation must
take into account the issue of appropriability and the
consequences of underinvestment in the civil aeronautics
industry. But, there are four other factors which should
be considered in making market intervention decisions:
o Scale economies in conducting aeronautics R&T,
o Military spi!lovers,
o Industry structure,
o Risk and the payback period.
The first three of these are defined briefly below.
The term "scale economies in conducting RaT" refers
to a situation in which certain R&T activities can be
conducted in a more cost-effective manner in large and
sophisticated facilities. For example, the NTF facility
has a greater capacity to analyze Cord Reynolds numbers
than do other existing wind tunnels. In this case, a
larger-scale facility leads to both cost reductions and
better research.
In judging the appropriateness of various public
policies, however, the real issue is whether there is a
need for more than one or, at most, a few aeronautics
research facilities. At least in the case of the NTF, it
is apparent that given its expense and the likely utilization
of the facility, the nation--both the public and private
110
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sectors--currently requires only one such facility. To
the extent that this is true of other aeronautics facilities,
we should consider whether the various policy scenarios
are likely to lead to the continued provision of them in
the future.
Military spillovers can take on several dimensions.
For example, technology transfers often occur (in both
directions) between the military and the civilian sectors
of the aeronautics industry. Additional spillovers occur
to the extent that the military gains surge capacity in
production from the civilian sector during time of war.
Again, we should evaluate the way in which the policy
scenarios addres3 these military spillovers.
The policy scenarios considered also can affect the
structure of the aeronautics industry. It is appropriate to
consider not only whether the policy scenario would tend
to lead to increased monopolization, but also what the
strategic behavior of firms would be vis-a-vis their
competitors under different policy regimes.
Each of the criteria listed above were selected
based on economic efficiency considerations. Appropriability
is an issue because the inability of private firms to
capture benefits will lead to underinvestment in R&T in
the industry. Underinvestment will reduce economic efficiency
III
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in the sense that a greater amount of scarce resources
will be otherwise require(] to produce a given level of
goods and services. Scale economies is clearly an efficiency
consideration: the failure to take advantage of scale
economies will require unecessary duplication of expensive
facilities and manpower. Military spillover effects
result in the provision of civil transport services and
national defense at lower costs than would otherwise be
incurred. Industry or market structure is likewise an
efficiency criterion: if a public policy results in
diminished competition in the industry, the standard
inefficiencies attributable to market imperfections associated
with greater monopoly power will occur (i.e., higher
prices, restricted levels of output, and inefficiency in
production). Finally, substantial risk and long payback
periods--like inappropriability--are likely to cause
underinvestment in R&T.
Policy Scenarios
There are five scenarios which describe the range of
options available with respect to government intervention
in the aeronautics R&T market. These scenarios, listed
in the order in which they will be considered, are:
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The free market/invisible hand scenario,
The free market/subsidy--tax credit scenario,
The user charge scenario,
The free market/monopoly R&T conglomerate scenario,
The "as is" scenario.
_Invisible Hand Scenario
This scenario represents a situation in which some
or all NASA programs are eliminated and the burden of
conducting research and technology is placed on the private
sector.
 ilitx
As it relies solely on the private sector to conduct
R&T, this scenario is appropriate only if no serious
market failures due to the partial appropriability of
aeronautics R&T can be detected. The analysis indicates
that appropriability is generally a problem in R&T markets.
The exposure of aeronautics to underinvestment in R&T is
particularly acute because of the high research content
and wide technology base which characterizes aeronautics
production. In short, one would expect to see substantial
underinvcstment in those R&T activities most difficult to
appropriate--basic research, and some applied research
and infratechnology--under this scenario.
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Scale Economies in Conductinq R&T
While it may be feasible for the government to sell
off some of its large-scale facilities, such as the NTF,
the building of new facilities could be threatened under
this scenario. Moreover, there would be a propensity to
conduct development work at some of these facilities at
the expense of discipline research. In addition, the
economic viability of facilities designed to conduct
mostly discipline research would be threatened as the
demand for this type of work declines. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, all work conducted would be
owned exclusively by the firm conducting research, thus
eliminating the dissemination of data and reducing the
rate of technology transfer within the industry. A likely
result would be the duplication of expensive experiments,
which would remove one of the primary benefits attributable
to the scale factor.
Industry Structure
Under this scenario, it is likely that firms with
well-established positions in certain product lines would
have an advantage over their competitors in conducting
certain types of R&T. For example, a firm with several
civil transport projects under way simultaneously could
spread its R&T activities over a larger revenue base than
114
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could a smaller competitor. Because the results of these
R&T activities would not be transferred, as they are
through NASA, it is likely that the industry would become
more concentrated. 1 Furthermore, the market imperfections
typically attributable to monopolies--higher prices and
lower output--would be more likely to be present in the
industry than tbey are today.
Military Spillovers
A more concentrated industry structure would affect
the military in two ways. First, fewer firms would be
involved in both military and civilian markets, and, as a
result, competitors disadvantaged in civilian markets
would be less able to provide the surge capacity that may
be necessary in the event of war. Second, the tendency
toward increased concentration in the civilian market
could spillover into mill ary markets and adversely affect
the cost-effectiveness of DOD procurements.
Risk and Payback Period
Neither the risk nor the payback period problems
would be mitigated under the free market/invisible hand
scenario. Rather, the burden of conducting risky projects
having relatively long payback periods would be placed on
the private sector.
iWe recognize, of course, that by some measures,
the industry is already highly concentrated. Nonetheless,
potential competitors or entrants into the industry do
exist, thus mitigating the concentration of actual producers.
For a fuller discussion of this topic, see Section III
on technological rivalry.
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Conclusions
The free market/invisible hand scenario does not
lead to a set of attractive results in terms of the criteria
for public policies outlined above.
The Free M_Subsidz scenario
In this situation, some or all NASA programs are
eliminated and R&T responsibilities are given to the
private sector, but the government subsidizes private R&T
efforts. Subsidies could be designed to encourage certain
types of R&T, either the most desirable or those types
where problems of appropriability are present. The subsidies
could take the form of direct payments, additional IR&D
allowances or tax credits; the implications are the same
for any form of subsidy.
Appropriability
Theoretically, at least, it is possible to subsidize
firms to conduct less attractive R&T activities than they
would in the absence of subsidies--e.g., discipline,
infrastructure, and certain types of applied research.
The ideal subsidy would compensate the firm for R&T benefits
that could not otherwise be appropriated.
Several rather difficult management problems emerge,
however. These include:
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o Designing and administering a subsidy scheme
that would overcome private firms' natural
propensity to conduct proprietary R&T, while,
at the same time, avoiding overcompensation.
o Developing a workable forum in which government
subsidized R&T is publically disseminated.
(Otherwise, the rate of technology diffusion--both
within the aeronautics industry and to other
industries--will decline substantially. The
diffusion of technology should be encouraged so
that the spillover to other aeronautics firms
and other industries can be realized.)
o Avoiding the unwarranted duplication of R&T
efforts.
Although the subsidization of privately conducted R&T may
be a conceptually attractive option for eliminating or
reducing underinvestment in neutral technology, as a
practical matter, the management of such a program would
be difficult.
Scale Economies in Conducting R&T
To the extent that the subsidized R&T would be conducted
in facilities that are smaller than necessary for maximum
efficiency, the cost of the research and the size of the
subsidies would be greater than would have been the case
117
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had the research been done in larger, more efficient NASA
facilities. To remedy this situation, the government
could subsidize firms to acquire certain types of R&T
facilities. In that case, the government could find
itself subsidizing duplicate installations, thereby increasing
the overall cost to the nation of aeronautics R&T. Because
of these problems, it would be necessary to continue the
operation of NASA facilities in order to take advantage
of scale economies.
Industrl Structure
The effects of this scenario on industry structure are
unclear. On the one hand, the government could elect to
provide subsidies more or less on an equal basis to all
firms in order to maintain the current number of competitors
in a given product line. On the other hand, the government
could be more selective in its subsidy decisions with the
possible effect of providing one or only a few firms with
significant advantages over competitors. In the latter
case, the industry would tend to become more concentrated
and the market imperfections attendant to monopoly would
become more likely. In the case where all firms were
subsidized equally, the cost of aeronautical R&T could be
much higher than it is today. In addition, it is likely
118
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that the free market/subsidy scenario would discourage
the potential entry of new firms Into the industry. Even
if subsidized RaT were publicly disseminated, existing
firms would have a greater advantage over potential entrants
than they do under the current arrangement.
Military Spillovers
If all civilian-oriented firms were subsidized on an
equal basis, then the cost of joint military/civilian
programs would increase. Selective subsidization of
certain private civilian aeronautics programs and the
resulting increased concentration in civilian markets
would (I) reduce surge capacity in time of war and (2)
potentially reduce competition for military procurements.
In addition, selective subsidization of civilian programs
could adversely affect military contractors currently
working on large scale military procurements.
Risk and the Payback Period
The subsidy scenario would reduce only slightly the
problem of the payback period and would have no impact on
risk. The problem of the payback period would be slightly
mitigated because private firms would receive some funding
as they conduct R&T activities, thus reducing the net
cost of projects. It is unlikely, however, that this
wou|d _;ignificantly reduce the duration of time necessary
llq
to achieve the break-even point, since the subsidy would
only be large enough to compensate the firm for otherwise
inappropriable benefits.
Although the subsidy would reduce the net cost to
the fi_m of conducting neutral R&T, it would not otherwise
affect the probability of a successful commercial outcome.
Thus, the subsidy would not reduce risk.
Conclusion
The free market/subsidy scenario would reduce under-
investment due to market imperfections and have a small
positive impact on the payback problem. Difficult administrative
problems would emerge, however. In addition, this scenario
would not resolve scale or risk problems and may, in the
long-run, produce an undesirable market structure.
The User-Charge Scenario
An alternative policy would have NASA retain all of
its current joint activities with industry and the military,
but these users would be charged fees sufficient to cover
NASA costs. This alternative contemplates that NASA
would conduct no R&T on its own, but would merely serve
the military and private sectors as a contractor.
Appropriability
Under this scenario, NASA would conduct none of its
current research activities that are unrelated to either
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private-sector or military development programs. These
are precisley the types of R&T activities which the private
sector is least likely to replace--i.e., discipline research,
infratechnologies, and certain types of applied research.
As a result, civilian aircraft could in the long run be
more expensive and of lower quality than is feasible for
a given level of resource expenditure. Inevitably, military
aircraft would be affected in the same way because there
could be reduced technology spillovers from the civilian
sector and because the military might be less willing
(than NASA) to conduct R&T activities which are far removed
from current military development programs.
Scale Economies in Conducting R&T
Because the NASA facilities would remain intact and
would remain available for industry and military use,
this scenario would have no direct impact on the benefits
attributable to scale economies in conducting R&T.
Industry Structure
The effect of this scenario on industry structure is
unclear. Firms with large market shares in a particular
product line might be better able to protect their competitive
position vis _ vis smaller rivals as technological change
slowed in the industry, A reduction in competition could
121
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loccur for two reasons. Plrst, potential entrants would
be discouraged somewhat becaule of the alo_lown in the
diffusion of technology. Second, the technology base of
the industry in general would tend to mature which could
lead to a stabilization of market shares. Two examples
of th;s latter effect would be the steel and auto industries
in the post-war era. Like the auto and steel industries,
a reduction in technological rivalry would make the domestic
aeronautic industry more suseptible to a major shakeout
caust,d by tho entry of well-financed foreign rivals.
Howew, r, it is difficult to forecast whether the effects
of a reduction in technological change would be as strong
in the at,ronautics industry as it has been in the steel
and auto industries.
Military Spillovers
One of the main results of this scenario would be a
slow-dow_ in civil R&T activities related to discipline
research, infratechnology, and certain types of applied
ro_t,arch. This could have an effect on the quality o[
some military aircraft, especially to the extent th,lt
NAt;A repr,,sents a critical mass of research talent which
wolzld b,, lost or reduced in size. Although the military
might bt, ,tblo to provide some of tho R&T activities which
ar,, par! iclllarly relevant in military applications, the
127
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i rate of technical progress in the civilian sector would
be slowed which would adversely affect spillovers to the
military sector. The suseptibility of the domestic industry
to foreign competition could also adversely affect military
programs.
Risk and the Payback Period
To the extent that a significant reduction in investment
in neutral R&T occurred, both the risk and payback problems
would become moot issues.
Conclusion
The user-charge scenario is unsatisfactory for two
reasons. First, as with the free market scenario, a
substantial reduction in nonproprietary R&T would occur;
this scenario would not resolve the problem of market
imperfections in R&T. Second, the military would no longer
enjoy the benefits of sharing current NASA R&T complementary
to its own needs. Unlike the free market scenario, however,
the benefits from scale economies in conducting R&T would
be realized.
The Free Market/Monopoly R&T Conglomerate Scenario
The objective of this scenario is to allow private
firms to assume R&T responsibilities, giving them the
opi)ortunity to form an R&T conglomerate to take advantage
123
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! of scale factors and facilitate the tralLsfer of technologies
among participating firms.
Appropriability
In theory, by participating in an R&T conglomerate,
each firm could capture the benefits of joint research.
Furthermore, this conglomerate would have incentives to
conduct the types of R&T that single firms might not
conduct because of market imperfections.
Scale Economies in Conducting R&T
Presumably by forming a conglomerate, the industry
could spread the cost of large-scale facilities over all
of their product lines. As a result, in theory, the cost
of conducting R&T would be at least as low as is currently
the case through the use of NASA facilities.
Industry Structure
Obviously, this scenario holds a certain attraction
at least with respect to appropriability and scale economy
issues. The question is whether firms would have sufficient
invontive to join and to operate efficiently such an R&T
conglomerate. First, one must question whether firms cur-
rently holding strong positions in certain product lines--
e.g., commercial transports--would have incentives to join
a conglomerate and whether their participation could pass
antitrust tests. Clearly, market leaders would be of
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two minds when considering the research conglomerate.
On the one hand, they would want to join to insure that
they have available to them any significant research results
that might be forthcoming. On the other hand, if they did
not join, and the research conglomerate were not productive,
the market leaders might be able to exploit their current
market positions for a longer period of time.
In reality, the decision may rest with the Antitrust
Division of the Justice Department. In a recently completed
policy statement entitled "Antitrust Guide Concerning
Joint Research Ventures"2 the Justice Department lays
down a series of general guidelines concerning research
conglomerates. One of the key characteristics of these
guidelines is that the Department will choose to study
very carefully any R&T conglomerate which would include
firms having more than 25 percent of market share in any
particular product line. Clearly, this would represent a
problem for market leaders in several aeronautical product
lines, including commercial transports, large-scale engines,
and perhaps helicopters.
2U.S. Department of Justice, Antitrust Division,
(November 1980).
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Whether these antitrust problems could be overcome
cannot be answered here, but it is likely that any research
conglomerate excluding the market leaders in aeronautics
would not be able to generate sufficient capital to be
effective. Yet, participation of those firms in a conglomerate
would be subject to antitrust problems.
Military Spillovers
The effects on the military depend directly on whether
the R&T conglomerate is successful. A productive conglomerate
would be a good substitute for NASA programs. However,
it seems unlikely that either the administrative or antitrust
problems that would surface in an aeronautic R&T conglomerate
could be overcome. An ineffective R&T conglomerate would:
(I) reduce competition in the civilian industry, which
could adversely affect competition in the military sector,
and (2) reduce the rate of technological innovation in
the civil sector which could adversely affect both the
cost and quality of military aircraft.
Risk and Payback period
By combining R&T resources in a conglomerate, aeronautics
firms would be able to diversify their R&T risk. The
conglomerate structure would have no effect on the payback
period.
126
(_lm_ Resesrch ._s_cl,teJ. Inc.
Conclusion
In theory, a R&T conglomerate would reduce the private
appropriability problem and capture scale economies in
research. However, there are likely to be significant
administrative problems in organizing and maintaining
such an organization because of the strategic behavior
that is likely to arise. In addition, there may be antitrust
problt.ms in organizing the conglomerate.
The "As Is" Scenario
This final policy contemn, fates no chan¢]es in
the institutional role currently played by NASA in the
civil aeron,lutics industry. Certain aspects of the funding
of NASA RaT activities, however, might be altered. These
will be discussed presently.
A_}2t_(/}/ri ab i 1 i ty
In general, NASA R&T activities concentrate on discipline
research, infratechnology, and certain types of applied
res,,arch. These are precisely the R&T activities which
prlvnte sector firms h,_,'e least incentive to col,duct
because of the imperft'ctions in the R&T market.
One w,,aknoss of this policy scenario, however, is
th,' dltliculty of det,,rmininq the appropriate scale of
NA.':A act ivit ies. llaving demonstrated market failures in
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the R&T market--i.e., that private markets will tend to
underallocate resources to R&T--does not address the
issue of "how much" and exactly what type of R&T NASA
should conduct. Theoretically, of course, NASA should
expand (or contract) each R&T project so that the incremental
social benefits are equated with incremental program oppor-
tunity costs. The absence of price signals from the market,
however, makes it difficult to assess potential social
benefits. As a result, both the scale and type of R&T
must be based on scientiflc judgement of the likely social
benefits.
Scale Economies in Conducting R&T
NASA currently operates several large-scale facilities
which may exhibit significant scale economies. In some
cases, there may be no need for more than one of these
facilities--e.g., the NTF. In making these facilities
available to the private sector and the military, NASA
reduces the cost of aeronautics R&T.
Industry Structure
The institutional structure of NASA is designed to
make available to the industry virtually all of the research
results that are forthcoming. In this way, NASA not only
promotes rapid technological advances, but also ensures
that spillovers from neutral technologies are captured by
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aeronautics firms and other industries. By providing a
common technology base for the aeronautics industry, NASA
also keeps all aeronautics firms up-to-date on technological
advances and thereby enhances actual and potential compztition
in the industry. Finally, because NASA's activities are
far removed from commercial applications, its near-term
effects or industry structure should be neutral.
Military Spillov@rs
By disseminating the results of its R&T activities,
NASA keeps aeronautics firms technologically current
which enhances the capabilities of these firms to provide
surge capacity for military production in time of war.
The common technology base provided by NASA also has
spillove_ effects in the military sector which reduces
the cost and increases the quality of military aircraft.
Risk and Payback Period
NASA conducts R&T which is most risky and characterized
by the longest payback period. These are precisely the
activities that private firms are likely to underinvest
in; NASA R&T activities therefore complement private R&T.
However, the fact that a specific risky R&T project
is conducted by NASA instead of a private firm will not
necessarily change the likelihood of a success. This,
however, is not the sense in which risk will be reduced.
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Tather as a centralized government institution, NASA
can pool the risk of severa] projects together, thus
mitigating risk through diversification, in other words,
the risk facing individual members of society, whom NASA
represents, is collectively less than the risk that any
one single firm would face. Moreover, given the already
high level of risk facing firms in the private sector,
there is a substantial likelihood that they will be
unwilling or unable to accept additional risk.
It should also be recognized that NASA, like private
firms, may have a bias toward projects that have the
potential for more immediate success. At NASA, however,
the criterion for success is scientific discovery rather
than commercial payoff. Since scientific discovery preceeds
commercial development in the typical product cycle, the
"as is" scenario, with NASA conducting and sponsoring
basic and applied research, does remedy, at least partially,
the problem of the payback period.
Conclusions
The current institutional arrangement between NASA
and the private civil aeronautics industry is appropriate.
NASA R&T activities tend to correct for private underinvestment
in R&T, promote efficiency in the production of R&T, and
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facilitate military apillover. Moreover, they are at
leat neutral with respect to industry structure.
Final Comments Concerning NASA User Chdrges
The major conclusion of this study is that the insti-
tutional role played by NASA in the civil aeronautics
industry is appropriate from an economic standpoint.
However, the allocation of resources within NASA facilities
remains problematical, even while recognizing that imposing
a fee system for all uses may have the undesirable effect
of biasing the allocation of resources away from neutral
technologies.
This problem is discussed in some detail below.
First, a solution is offered that considers only the
economic efficiency aspects of the problem. Following
this, a discussion of practical and administrative problems
is provided.
Currently the demand for some NASA facilities exceeds
their cdpacity. The root cause of the queues, or excess
demand, is that many users place a greater value on use
of the facilities than the fee charged for them. In
short, the price is too low.
Before describing a solution to this problem, it is
appropriate to explain why excess demand poses an economic
efficiency pzoblem. Anytime excess demand exists in a
131
Gellman Research Assoc_es, Inc.
LL
i
market, an economic "shortage" is created. When a shortage
exists, there is no guarantee that those who benefit most
from the scarce service--i.e., use of the facilities--will
gain access to the service. The expected benefits from
users are best measured by the price they are willing and
able to pay. If the queue is eliminated by charging a
price sufficiently high to eliminate excess demand, those
users placing the highest value on the service will receive
the service. This follows since any potential user could
gain access to the facilities by bidding-up user charges.
This, in fact, is the method by which the market system
allocates goods and services among many consumers.
It is also important to note that the true economic
cost of the use of such facilities cannot be measured by
the variable or marginal cost of operating the facility.
Rather, the true cost must be measured as the benefit
foregone by the best project that does not gain access to
the facility. This cost, in a very real sense, is an
opportunity cost.
The central question is: What price should be set
for use of facilities with excess demand and who should
pay this price? The answer, based on strict economic
efficiency criterion, is straightforward. User charges
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should b_ sot su_'h th4t th_ queuea are olLminatod } and
all u_,r_, includin_ tqASA and the m[litarF, ahould pay
tht,_ pr _'_.
Ou,, pr_blenl, of course, is that both NASA and military
bud,lot._ at_ _ funded institutionally. A_ _ r_sult.
thor,' i._ a ,'o1_t'erl_that b_ic or discipline research will
b_ :_qtl,,t_d out in favor of commercial users. Thooretlcally,
tht.': n,,,'J trot b_. th,_ _'_ll_. Th,_ budgots of both NASA ,_nd
the" mtILt._Iy ,'ould l,o ,_dlti._tod upward ._o that th_'y could
_."t'_lP,_'¢'_(" WIt_t |'_1 iV,"lt¢ _- U._iz_I-"i . Ol with o,'_t'h oth_-r, Tile not
|%11,| |'_' Nt'_:;e_ ,'till,| 1|1_ IIII | 1[;'1I|'_' Well|t| ll[t i111_t_|y b_ t'otitrtl¢_|,
Wh,tt I:_, 1111|sort,-1111. [ |_H11 _"l¿l _| [ LL'I¢'tI_"_' st,'tttd|_Otllt . IS_
th,lt ,111 ll:,.sl,_ _'ot'l,_lt|t_t' t|l_' t I'11_ oi_|_ottLtnity co.,it ot
11.-:11_,i t it_, t,-1_'llit t_sd, Aq,lill, tllt_ _,'_ll |_o illt},l.,_1,il@t_ ds t|lc,
t.t,'ll _t I,'..'-. ,':_,t t i1_,| 1_1i_'_'. "_ tit,'1| _,| I11111_,'111@ OX_.'_'._'I deltt,_nd
will ,|tt,tt,ltll_." th,_t th_','_o _'_st._ ,_11_' t@_'o_l|ll_'d. '|'he t-,_'t
th,tt I_t tV,'lt,' II,-i_'t,"l _'xt,'_t ,lllotd:_ t|l_ t'tHtVt_llll'llt "t" t_| h,'tv_tl_|
_t,111:11,'_ fl,,lu tit,' |_11v,'ttt, tll,llkt't til,-It ,_.'tv_' _l,'; tttdl_,','_tOl_
Lt'h,' _'1 1111111;tt IOll _s[ tit.' _ltl.'ll,' 11_'_1 lie| |_t' lllt_l|_l_'t.'_|
| 1t,'1,11 ly. ,'_s111_' W.'tt| 111,1 I 111_':t ,'It I' 1101111,t[ III tyi'i_','l|
|_I|.'.It1.".:; _..'t.-It t_II.'i. ,_t_ lOl1_l .I.'I llh|tVt_|tl.'II.'1 ill I11,'
q11.'11.' .11.' 11_t W111111.I t_ l'.Iy t_1 Ill.' p1trtt.'q,' ot _.'1111,'I
11'1,'. w,ll t ttt,V | 111_'.'I i_," 11o 1_1_I_|¢'111,
lit
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As a practical matter, of course, there are several
administrative problems that surface with the prescribed
economic solution. These include:
o Practical problems of administrating user charges
that eliminate the queue but are not so unstable
as to create uncertainty problems.
o The administration of recycled funds paid by
NASA and the military.
o The difficulty facing administrators in estimating
budgets in the face of changing user charges.
o The impacts on the private sector of uncertainty
regarding future user charges.
o The fact that many existing R&T projects, both
privately and publicly funded, were based on
expectations of relatively low user charges.
As a policy matter then, final resolution of this problem
must weigh the potential gains in economic efficiency
with the resulting administrative burdens.
For uractical purposes, it may be desirable only to
adjust the current technical merit selection process to
incI'ease the information available to the administrator
of the facility and to charge certain groups for use of the
f,_cility when such charges are unlikely to have undesirable
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effects. For example, by charging the military the marginal
cost of NASA facilities, military planners would be induced
to consider the effects of their research in their own
budgets instead of depending upon implicit subsidy from
NASA. Such a charging system is unlikely to affect significantly
the ultimate allocation of military resources or spillovers
from military R&T, but it would aid planners in assigning
priorities to new projects.
Likewise, it may be appropriate for NASA to evaluate
the current fees it charges to private firms conducting
proprietary research in its facilities. Any reallocation
of private resources would be unlikely to have an undesirable
effect on spillovers to other aeronautics firms or other
industries because the research involved is proprietary.
In summary, the allocation of scarce NASA resources
should continue to be governed by the likely future benefits
of the R&T projects. The current technical selection
mechanism may be the only feasible means of approximating
these likely future benefits. However, keeping track of
the costs of these activities and charging for military
research and proprietary private research may improve the
technical merit selection process.
As a final note, higher user charges may not be the
best solution, even in terms of strict economic efficiency
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criteria. Specifically, the demand for some facilities
q
could be sufficient to justify the construction of new
facilities or the expansion of existing facilities. This
would be the case if the total expected benefits of expanded
capacity exceeded the long run opportunity cost of construc-
tion and operation. In that case, raising user charges to
levels that would eliminate the queue would be inefficient.
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Vl: SLINNARY AND FINAL CONNENTS
?he major conclusion of the present study is that
the current institutional arrangement of NASA with respect
to the civil aeronautics industry should continue, Includin 9
the maintenance of R6T programs which cut across industry
boundaries." The current role of NASA is to address the
problem of underinvestment in aeronautics R&T which arises
for the tel lowing majo_- reasons:
o Firms in all industries will quite generally
tend to underinvest in R&T when they are unable
to capture sufficient benefits from innovations
to justify investment in these activities.
o This proble,u appt,,_rs to bt, particularly acute
in the aeronautics industry because: (I) so
much ot the; technology is disembodied as opposed
to bt, inq a physic,t1 entity which can bt, easily
l_,Itt'ntt'd; | (2) firms find it difficult to diversify
th,, risk inherent in th¢, many larqt,-scalt, R_'l'
activitit, s in aeronautics: (3) aeronautics
i,toduct ion i:; ch,=ractt, t'i:'t,d by high rt, st,;_rch
IR,'c,_ll th,lt "dis,'mbodiod" trchnoloqy rt, l_rt,.,_t, rlts
knowl,,,l,l,, th.lt n,,,,d not bt, imlu,ddt, d in a physic,ll t,nl ity.
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intensity and a wide high technology base which
increases the likelihood of aeronautics products
being more costly or of lower quality as a
result of underinvestment either in the aeronautics
industry or in other high technology industries.
The study has addressed a full range of possible
policies to address the problem of underinvestment in R&T
and aeronautics, the main conclusion is that the current
institutional role played by NASA should be preserved
because:
o NASA's current activities focus upon those R&T
areas which are most likely to be subject to
underlnvestment--basic research, the production
of infratechnology, and applied research.
o The spillovers between the civil aeronautics
industry and the military sector are more easily
taken advantage of within an institution whose
mission includes the transfer of technology.
o The spillovers between the civil aeronautics
iv,(:ustry and other industries within the economy
are best facilitated in an institution which
addresses directly R&T activities which cut
across industry lines.
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Competition between aeronautics firms--in both
the civil and military sectors--is more likely
to be preserved with NASA involvement than
without NASA involvement in aeronautics R&T.
The cost of aeronautics R&T is likely to be
lower through government intervention in those
cases where large-scale facilities are required.
By centralizing R&T resources, it becomes possible
to diversify the risk of large-scale R&T projects.
Because NASA, as a government institution,
operates under a different set of incentives
than do private firms, it will be more patient
in awaiting the payoffs from R&T activities--
especially those furtherest removed from
commercialization.
Final Comments
One final question remains: whether aeronautics is
in some way unique or special? Answering this question
would require a broad-based comparative study of the market
for R&T activities in many other industries--especially
high technology industries. Such an undertaking is beyond
the scope of the present project. Nonetheless, the finding
that NASA's present institutional role is the most efficient
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means of overcoming the problem of underinvestment in
R&T may mean that civil aeronautics is special (or unique)
but it is also probably true that new (but perhaps different)
policies may be required in other high technology industries
to address similar problems. For example, currently the
Congress is deliberating whether or not it would be appro-
priate to extend the duration of the life of patents for
those industries such as the drug industry which are subject
to significant delays in product introductions because of
time-consuming and costly safety regulations. Such a
policy may adequately address the problems of underinvest-
ment in research in the drug industry because, aside from
the problem of regulatory lag, patents do provide adequate
means for innovating drug firms to capture the benefits of
their new product introductions. In contrast, lengthening
the duration of the life of patents would have little or
no effect on the incentives of firms to invest in R&T in
the aeronautics industry where so much of the technology
is disembodied as opposed to being embodied in physical
devices or chemical compounds.
What this suggests is that the problem of underinvest-
ment in research and in the development of technology is
a general problem which affects the private sector and
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especially high technology industries where research
makes up a significant portion of the firm's production
processes. The aeronautics industry may be special in
that while significant portion of its output is sold in
the private sector, it is still economically efficient
for the government to play an active role in R&T activities.
Government participation in the production of R&T is also
appropriate in cases where the government is the sole
b,yer of high technology products--missiles and spacecraft,
and ordnance. But this form of government intervention
may not be appropriate in other high technology industries
where the problems of underinvestment may arise for quite
different reasons.
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